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This paper discusses the separation of powers as it relates to the New Zealand 
Constitution. The awhor argues that the New Zealand Constitution contains 
insufficient separation of powers, and suggests options for reform. 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
The point of constitutionalism. and its application in this paper is not to engage in 
politics. Rather. it is to set out rules upon which politics can be based. 1 As Professor 
Bruce Ackerman succinctly put it, "the first great theme of modern constitutionalism is 
democracy; the second is its limitation."2 The object is to adapt democratic government 
to the interests of the people and the preservation of liberty. 3 Therefore, in the 
constitutional state there must be a set of rules that restrain government power to prevent 
its abuse. 4 As Madison pointed out, it is no alleviation that unlimited power is exercised 
by a plurality of hands; many despots will surely be as oppressive as one. 5 Therefore the 
theory of how to limit power is an essential consideration in forming a constitution. 
In contrast to the American and Australian Constitutions, 6 the development of the 
New Zealand Constitution has not been driven by theory. 7 At least with respect to the 
1 It is accepted that liberal thought , on which this paper is based is not universally accepted. Unfortunately 
because of space constraints the merits of liberal thought cannot be addressed here, and the paper will 
proceed on the premise that liberal thought is of benefit. For a leading critique of liberalism see the work 
of Roberto Unger, in particular RM Unger K11 01l'ledge mzd Poli1ics (The Free Pres~. 1ew York, 1975): R 
M Unger Law /11 Modem Society (The Free Press, New York, 1976); RM Unger Passion An Essay 011 
Personali1y (The Free Press, New York, 1984). Similarly there are arguments that politics cannot be 
separated from constitutionalism. Again the merits of this debate cannot be canvassed adequately in this 
paper, and discussion will proceed on the premise that the division of constitutionalism and politics can be 
made. For a critique of this premise see Barber N W "Prelude to the Separation of Powers" (200 I] CLJ 59, 
67 - 71. 
2 B Ackerman "The New Separation of Powers" (2000) 113 Harv L Rev 63-t, 688: see also M J C Vile 
Co11s1illlrio11alis111 and rhe Separation of Pml'ers (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967) I. 
3 W Wilson Col!Stitutiona/ Gol'em111e111 in rhe United States (Columbia Universit) Press. ew York. 1908) 
2. 
4 M JC Vile Co11stitwio11alis111 a11d the Separa1io11 of PoH·ers (Clarendon Pres~. O.\ford. 1967 ) . 
5 Madison Federalisr 48 in SF Mittell (ed) The Federalist (National Home Librar) Foundauon, Washinton 
DC) in SF Mittell (ed) The Fedemlisr (Nati onal Ilome Library Foundation. Wa~hinton DC) 32-t. 
6 G Palmer Ne11• Zealand's Constitution in Crisis (John Mclndoe. Dunedin. 1992) -+. For e\ample 111 the: 
case of the USA the Federalisr Papers of Hamilton, Jay and Madison 111 S r M1ttell (ed) The Federal/II 
(National Ilome Library Foundation, Washinton DC) provide an exce ll ent e\ample of a thorough 
discussion and debate as to how the constitution should be arranged. 
7 G Palmer. above, 4. ~ 
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relationship between Parliament and the executive, our Constitution has generally been 
created with little attention to overall structure. 8 Given the lack of critical analysis 
behind much of our constitution's development. the Constitution should now be critically 
analysed to assess its suitability. 
Of the theories attempting to find a solution to balancing the interests of efficient and 
limited government the separation of powers has been the most influential. standing as 
one of the great pillars of western thought. 9 It is on that basis that this paper proposes to 
examine firstly how power is distributed in the New Zealand Constitution. and secondly 
whether and how this should be changed to safeguard individual liberties. 
Although the separation of powers has become somewhat confused over time, 10 the 
doctrine essentially argues that the legislative, executive and judicial branches of 
government should be separated so that one cannot accumulate too much power and act 
in a tyrannical fashion. This is complemented by the doctrine of checks and balances, 
which holds that the branches need to have the ability to restrain each other. In tandem 
these two theories provide the basis for the modern theory of separation of powers, which 
strives to create balance between the three branches of government. 
The separation of powers is particularly apposite as a tool of analysis in ew Zealand 
because of the unusuall y close relationships between the three central organs of 
government. In ew Zealand it is possible for the executive to use its control over 
Parliament to change the law to su it its own ends and do so in a fa hion that the Courts 
cannot question. For example in 1982 the National government granted itself water 
consents for the Clyde Dam, 11 and more recently the Labour Government retrospectively 
8 R Mulgan Poli1ics 111 Ne1v Zealand (2"d edn. Auckland University Press, l 997) 54; G Palmer , above, 4. 
9 M J C Vile Consfi//(fionalism and t!te Separc11io1L of Pmvers (Clarendon Pres , Oxford, 1967) l. 
10 M JC Vile, above, 12. 
11 Clutha Development (Clyde Dam) Empowering Act 1982; see detailed discussion in Part Ill A 2 
Uncontrolled Lawmaking below. 
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suspended electoral law to avoid a member of the Labour Caucus having to vacate hi s 
seat. 12 
By permitting this unusually close relationship between the executive and legislative 
branches, unrestrained by the courts, New Zealand's Constitution does not contain 
sufficient separation of powers safeguards to protect citizens from abusive or careless use 
of state power. To remedy this situation the executive legislative and judicial branches of 
government need to be further separated, and reananged so that they check and balance 
each other more than they presently do. 
The best solution cannot be found in either Westminster or Washington .13 Rather the 
best solution is some form of constrained parliamentarianism. 14 With respect to the 
executive-legislative relationship the proposed optimal solution is as follows: 15 A 
bicameral legislature. the lower house being the same as the CUITent House of 
Representati ves. except that its members are selected on a proportional basis. The upper 
house should be constituted of representatives from the cunent electorates. Cabinet 
government should continue, drawing its membership exclusively from the lower house . 
An alternative, but also beneficial option is to maintain a unicameral legislature, but 
to require ministers to resign from Parliament upon accepting a post in Cabinet. Their 
seats in Parliament would then be allocated to the next candidate on their party list. 
While this arrangement is a second choice, it is still endorsed as a highly beneficial 
change. 
The judiciary should continue to be separate from the other branches of government. 
Furthermore, they should be entrusted with enforcing an entrenched and supreme 
12 Electoral (Vacancies) Amendment Act 2003; see detailed discussion in Part III A 2 Uncontrolled 
Lawmaking below. 
13 B Ackerman 'The New Separation of Powers·· (2000) l 13 Harv L Rev 633, 640. 
14 See B Ackerman , above. 
15 This is only a brief outline for the purposes of introduction only. Almost all of the features of the 
government outlined are subject to qualifications and additions. For a more detailed description refer to 
part IV A Separating the Legislative and Executive Branches below. 
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constitution. Ideally the supreme constitution would include both the Constitution itself 
and the ew Zealand Bill of Ri ght Act 1990 (''Bill of Rights"). 
II. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS. 
A. Aristotle to Montesquieu: The Development of the Separation of Powers. 
The separation of powers date backs to Aristotle, who first considered the allocation 
of different roles to separate branches of government.
16 Specifically, Aristotle saw 
Constitutions as having three elements, a deliberative element, the magistracies, and a 
judicial power. 
17 
However, Aristotle did not suggest that the roles of government should 
be divided to limit the power of the state. Rather, his concern of constitutional design 
was to have popular control of government, 
18 and a proper balance in government 
between the classes. 19 
Essentially. from Aristotle until the renaissance. there was no progression tov\ ards 
what is now known as the separation of powers.
20 Throughout this period the courts 
essentially exercised the legislative power,
21 and the division of roles between Monarch 
and Parliament were generally unclear.
22 Constitutional concerns through this period 
were directed at balancing the interests of the classes rather than eparating the offices of 
government.
23 
principally limit the Monarch generally. not to confine him or her to an 
executive role. 24 
16 M J C Vile Constit11ti0Jw!is111 and the Separation of Po wers (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967) 22, 316. 
17 Aristotle The Politics IV. 14 in S Everson (ed) J Barnes (trans) Cambridge Texts in the History of 
Political Thought: AristOile The Politics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 1988) l 02. 
18 M JC Vile, above, 22. 
19 See for examp le Aristotle's assertion th at not having classes represented will lead to oligarchy: Aristotle 
The Politics IV. 6 in S Everson (ed) J Barnes (trans) Ca111bridge Tex1s 111 the H1 ston of Poli11cal T/1011~/w 
Aristotle The Poli1icJ (Cambridge Uni\ ersit) Press. Cambridge, 19 8) 91. 
20 M JC Vile, above, 24. 
21 M JC Vile, above, 24. 
22 M JC Vile, above, 26 - 29 . 
23 M JC Vile, above, 33. 
24 M JC Vile, above, 37 - 38. 
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The concept of three separate branches of government servmg different functions 
seems to have first arisen in Dallison 's Royalist Defence of 1648.25 Similarly the 
separation of powers played a part in Marchamaunt Nedham's 1656 The Excellence of 
the Free State. 26 However. the separation of powers fell into the background after the 
monarchical Humble Petition and Advice of 1657.27 
The development of the Separation of Powers in its own right was primarily achieved 
through the work of Locke and Montesquieu. although as both were building on previous 
thought. neither is the sole origin of the doctrine. 28 Locke 's contribution was to make it 
)9 
clear that the power to make and enforce laws should be separated,- and more 
importantly, to expound the idea that power should be divided to prevent concentrations 
of power that would lead to temptation for its abuse;30 the essence of the separation of 
powers.31 However, Locke 's emphasis on legislative supremacy, 32 and lack of a separate 
judicial power,
33 left him short of articulating the doctrine, which not only has three 
separate bodies, but also implies a degree of co-ordinate status among them. 34 
It was Montesquieu who then consolidated the doctrine and established its rem ai nin g 
basic elements. Montesquieu recognised the judiciary as a separate branch for the first 
time, emphasising that they should be treated on par with the other branches. and operate 
25 Cited in M JC Vile Co11stir11rio11alis111 and rh e Separation of Powers (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967) -+5 . 
26 M JC Vile, above, 50. 
27 M J C Vile, above, 5 l. 
28 M J C Vile. above, 58. 
29 
Locke Second Trearise 011 Covem111ew XII , l-13 a11d XIV, 159 in P Laslett (ed) Co111bridge Texrs u1 rhe 
History of Polirica/ Thought: John Locke Tivo Trearises of Covem111ew (2"d ed, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1988) 364 and 374. 
30 Locke Second Trearise 011 Coven1111e111 XII , 143 in P Laslett (eel) Cambridge Texts in rhe History of 
Polirical Thoughr: Joh11 Locke Tivo Trearises of Government (2 11d ed, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1988) 364. 
31 M JC Vile, above, 61. 
32 Locke Second Treatise on Covemmenr XI, 134 - XI, /42 in P Laslett (ed) Cambridge Texts in the History 
of Polirical Thoughr: John Locke Tivo Trearises of Covem111ent (2 11d ed, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1988) 354 - 363. 
33 Locke onl y recogni sed that the judiciary shou ld be indifferent, upright and authorised but does nor 
conceive of them as being a separate pan of the state on par with the legislati ve and executi ve; Lode 
Second Treatise 011 Covemment IX, 13 1 and X!, 136 in P Laslett (ed) Cambridge Texts in the History of 
Political Thoughr: John Locke Two Trearises of Covem111e111 (2 11 d ed, Cambridge University Press . 
Cambridge, 1988) 354 and 358. 
34 M JC Vile, above, 62. 
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independently of them. 35 Thi s allowed him established the three branches of 
government; legislative, executive and judicia!,3
6 and to turn them into a form of divi s ion 
and balancing between the constituent bodies of the Constitution.
37 Like Locke, 
Montesquieu was firm in asserting that the doctrine intended to protect liberty.
38 
Montesquieu though was vague on the details of his theory, neglecting to include any 
analysis of how the political function s should be classified as legislative, executive or 
judicial.
39 
Furthermore, his use of the English Constitution as a model of the separation 
of powers is questionable. Given that in 1688 England lost the separation of powers that 
had ex isted durin g the interregnum. it -eems that Montesquieu e ither miss-appreciated the 
nature of the English Constitution. or imposed attributes on it that he wanted to find ."rn 
None th e Jess. even if Montesquieu did not name it himself, the separation of powers was 
now an identifiable train of political thought. 41 
B. Pure Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances. 
While Montesquieu did not articulate what is now known as the pure doctrin e 
himself, hi s work forms the basis for the elementary form of the separation of powers; a 
blunt division of power between the executive legi slative and judicial branches . As M J 
C Vile, formulated it the pure doctrine is that: 42 
It is essential for the establishment and maintenance of political liberty that the government be 
divided into three branches or departments. the legis lature. the executive. and the judi ciary. To 
each of these three branches there ,~ a coITesponding identifiable funct ion of go,ernment, 
35 M J C Vile Co,witutiollalism and 1he Separation of Po1Vers (Clarendon Press, Oxford , 1967) 88. 
36 M J C Vi le, above, 87. 
37 
G H Sabine A History of Political Th eory re vised by J L Thorson (4'11 eel , Dryden Press, Hinsdale Ill1no1s, 
1973)5 14. 
38 Monresquieu Th e Spirit of the w11 ·s book XI eh -l para 2 in AM Cobler, B C Miller. and H S Stone (ec.l~ 
and trans) Cambridge Texts in the Historv of Political Thought (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge) 
155 - 156. 
39 
G H Sabine A History of Political Th eory revised by J L Thorson (-l '11 eel, Dryden Press. Hinsdale lll ino ,s. 
1973)5 15. 
~ G HSabine,above, 515. 
41 
M J C Vile Co11stitutio11alis111 and the Separation of Powers (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967) 85. 
42 M J C Vile, above, 13. 
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legislative executive, or judicial. Each branch of the government must be confined to the exercise 
of its own function and not allowed to encroach upon the functions of the other branches. 
Furthermore, the persons who compose these three agencies of government must be kept separate 
and distinct, no individual being allowed to be at the same time a member of more than one 
branch. In this way each of the branches wi ll be a check to the others and no singl e group of 
people wi ll be able t control the machinery of the State. 
The pure doctrine is the basic, but not immutable, starting point of the separation of 
powers. In practice though , it has proved to be impractical and impossible to maintain a 
clear distinction between the three branches of government postulated by the pure 
theory.
43 Because of the encroaching nature of power, .. ., unless governmental bodies are 
sufficiently connected to each other so that each can check the others' natural tendency to 
expand, the unchecked branch will encroach upon the others , and disturb the balance 
between the branches ... 
5 Therefore, unless the branches are fused to a certain extent. the 
necessary degree of separation between them cannot be protected ... 6 
Hence, the first object of checks and balances is to stop one branch exceeding its 
proper mandate and exercising powers that do not properly belong to it so as to 
overbalance other branches ... 
7 Secondly, such checks and balances are necessary if all 
powers are to be subordinate to the constitution ... 8 If constitutional government is to be 
maintained , then there must be a mechanism by which one branch can prevent the 
excesses of the other branch. Thus in the USA, it is deemed necessary for the President 
-1
3 
G Palmer Ullbrid/ed Power (2'"1 ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1987) 7: Madison Fedemlis1 47 
in SF Mittell (ed) The Federalis1 (National Home Library Foundation, Wash ington DC, 1961 ) 3 12 - 320: 
M JC Vile Co11s1itwiollalis111 and 1he Separmioll of PolVers (C larendon Press, Oxford, 1967) 144. 
-1-1 Madison Federalis1 48 in S F Mittell (ed) The Federalist (National Home Library Foundation. 
W ashington DC, 1961 ) 321; see also the above discussion in Part fI1 A 
.is Madison Federalist 48 in S F Mittell (eel) The Federalist ( ational Home Library Foundation, 
W ashington DC, 1961 ) 32 l. 
-1
6 Madison Federalist .J8 in S F Mittell (ed) The Federalist at ional Home Library Foundation, 
Washington D . 1961 J 32 1. 
-1
7 
Madison Federolisr -+ 7 in S F Mittell (ed) The Fedemlist (Nat ional Home Library Foundatitm. 
Washington DC, 1961 ) 312 - 320; Hamilton Federnlist 78 in SF Mnrell (eu) The Federn/1s1 (Nauonal 
Home Library Foundation, Washington DC. 1961 ) 502 - 511; M J C Vile Cons1i1u1ional1s111 al!d 1he 
Separation of Powers (C larendon Press, Oxford, 1967) 289 . 
.is M J C Vile, above, 240. 
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to be able to veto acts of the legislature, .. 9 and for the judiciary to strike down Acts of the 
legislature beyond the power allocated in the constitution,50 and impugn acts of the 
executive which are past their respective mandate.
51 
The tendency to accumulate power is most pronounced in the legislati ve branch.
52 
Because of the legislature·s function of making law, the natural tendency is for the 
legislature to assume a dominant position under a strict separation of powers. 53 This 
applies a fortiori in a Westminster system where the legislature is generally under the 
control of the executive. 54 Hence, in constitutions adhering to the separation of powers 
the centra l check on government is the power of the judiciary to strike down acts of the 
legislature beyond the authority of the constitution. 55 As Hamilton wrote:56 
No legislative act. .. contrary to the Constitution can be valid. To deny this, would be to affirm, 
that the deputy is greater than the principle; that the servant is above the master; that the 
representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of 
powers , may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid. 
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constituti onal judges of their O\I n 
powers.. this cannot be the nalllral presumption.. It is far more rational to suppose. that the 
courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature. 111 order. 
among other things , to keep the later within the limits assigned to their authorn, . 
-1
9 Constitution of the United States of America Art I § 7. although a two thirds majority \Ote 111 both house~ 
will overturn the presidential veto: An I ~ 7. 
50 In law the p0\1 er to judicially review legislation originates from Marb11rr ,. Madison ( I 03) I C'ranch 5 
US 137 , and \\'as also emphasised as necessa1") b) the founding fathers. See 111 particular Hamil1on 
Federalis1 78 in S F Mittell (eel) The Federalis1 (Na ti onal Home Library Foundation. Washington DC. 
1961 ) 502 - 511, especially at 505 - 506. 508 and 510. 
51 United States Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC§ 708. 52 Madison Federalist 48 in S F Mittell (eel) The Federalist (National Home Library Foundation, 
Washington DC, 1961) 322. 
53 The experience of the stare constitu ti ons of the American States before the federal constitution is a 
poignant example of this temlency M J C Vile Co11s1i1utio1wlis111 and the Separmion of Pml'ers (Clarendon 
Press. Oxford. 1967) 144: al o 119 - 175 generally. Even where there have been checks and balance this 
has been the experience of the USA for much of the Federations histOI") M J C V lie, abO\ e. 265. 5
.i See Pan III A Fusions of Power in the ew Zealand Constitution belo\1. 
55 For an examp le of the potency of thi s see the judgmenr of Scalia J Ill Morrison ,, Olson -1 87 US 65-1. 697 
- 734 (USSC) Scalia J. 
56 Hamilton Federalist 78 in S F Mittell (ed) The Federalis1 (National Home Libra1") Foundation. 
Washington DC. 1961 ) 505 - 506. 
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Thus the courts are the bulwarks of a limited constitution. 57 Consequentially in the 
USA the courts have the power to prevent the exercise of legislative power not authorised 
by the constitution,58 in addition to sharing with English courts the ability to impugn acts 
of the executive that do not have proper legal authorisation.59 
Friction between the branches is an inevitable effect of checks and balances and the 
division of power in a balanced . This is openly contemplated by the separation of 
powers. 60 As Brandeis J wrote in Myers v US the purpose of the separation of powers: 6 1 
(W]as not to avo id fri cti on, b111. by means of the inel'itab/e friction inc1clen1 10 the d1 s1rib1111on of 
the gove r11111en1a/ powers a111ong 1hree departments, to save the people from autocracy. 
Because such checks and balances necessarily involve the fusion of powers between 
the branches of government, and checks and balances are apposite to the doctrine of the 
separation of powers it is impossible to consider each theory in isolation. Hence. the 
subsequent analysis of the ew Zealand constitution will consider the appropriateness of 
checks and balances as well as separations of powers. 
C. Liberty: The Driving Force of the separation of Powers. 
The driving force behind the separation of powers is the idea that government should 
not interfere with individual liberty.62 The argument is that liberty can only exist in 
57 Hamilton Federalist 78 in S F Mittell (eel) Th e Federalist (National Home Library Foundation. 
Washington DC, 1961 ) 508 . 
58 This jurisdiction originates from Marb111 y 1· Madison ( 1803) l Cranch 5. 
59 In the USA thi s is clone under the United States Federal Admini strati ve Procedure Act. 5 USC * 55 3: 5 
USC § 706. In New Zealand thi s is under the doctrine of ultra vires, see Peters v Dm·ison 11997 J 2 NZLR 
164, 205 - 210 (CA) Tipping J. The importance of judicial review is di scussed further belov, 111 Pam Ill B 
Checks and Balances in the New Zealand Constitution and IV B Expanding the Power of the Jud1c1ar) 
below. 
60 E Barendt '·Separation of Powers and Constitutional Government" [ 1995] PL 599 . 602 - 603. 
61 Myers I' US (1926) 52 US 272. 293 (USSC) Brandeis J (di ssenting. emphasis added). 
62 E Barendt , above, 601. 
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moderate governme nts ,63 whereas tyrannical governments will naturall y lead to liberty 
b · · d 64 erng compromise . 
To achieve moderate government, the separation of powers argues that the amount of 
power an y member or body of go vernment should be limited. because human fra ilty 
would lead whoever acquired power to abuse it. As Montesquieu wrote: 65 
[I]t has eternall y been observed that any man who has power is led to abuse it; he continues until 
he finds limits .. .. Even virtue is in need of limits. 
Similarly Madison described power as being of an "encroaching nature,"66 summarising 
the dilemma as follows: 67 
If men were angels. no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither 
ex ternal not internal co ntrols on government would be necessa ry. In framing a government whi ch 
is to be administered by men over men. the grea t diffi culty li es in thi s: yo u must first enabl e the 
government to control the governed; and in the nex t place obli ge it to contro l itself. A dependence 
on the people is, no doubt , the primary contro l on the government; bill experiellce has taught 
mankind th e llecessity of auxilia ry precautions. 
The proble m of human fallibility is a l o refl ec ted in Lord Acton 's maxim that '·power 
tends to coITupt, and absolute power coITupts absolutely ,"68 which has been described as 
having an "uncomfortable degree of truth" in New Zealand.69 
63 Montesquieu The Spirit of the Laws book XI eh 4 para l in AM Cohl er, BC Miller, and H S Stone (eds 
and trans) Cambridge Texts in th e History of Political Thought (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 
155 . 
64 E Barendt '·Separation of Powers and Co nstitutional Government" [ 1995) PL 599 , 60 l. 65 Montesquieu Th e Spirit of the Laws book XI eh 4 para I in AM Cohl er, B C Miller. and H S Stone (eds 
and trans) Cambridge Texts in 1he History of Polit ical Th ought (Cambridge Uni versity Press . Cambridge) 
155. 
66 Madison Federalist 48 in S F Mittell (eel ) Th e Federalist (Nati onal Home Library Foundati on. 
Washington DC, 1961) 32 1. 
67 Madison Federalist 51 in S F Mittell (ed) The Federalist (National Home Libra1") Foundati on. 
Washington DC. 1961) 337 (emphas is added). 
68 Quoted in A T Vanderbilt Th e Doctrine of th e Separation of Powers and its Presem Day Significance 
(U ni versity of Nebraska Press, Nebraska. l 953), 37; Great Thinkers on Li bert) 
http://www. libert vs torv.net/LSTl IINKACTON .html (last accessed 20 August 2003 ). 
69 G Palmer Neiv Zealand 's Constitution in Crisis (John Mclndoe, Dunedin , 1992) , 51. Although thi s 
comment was made before the introducti on of MMP. the author suggests that thi s is a comment on human 
nature. whi ch a political sys tem can onl y guard aga inst, and cannot change. 
13 
The solution offered by the separation of powers to ensure moderate government was 
that government should be divided so that power will check power,
70 
preventing the 
l .b 7J accumulation of power in one branch of the state. thus protecting individual I erty. 
Conversely. if governmental power is accumulated. liberty will suffer.
72 
Specifically. the three branches of government (legislative. executive and Judicial l 
should be separated, so that no one person, body or institution can exercise all 
governmental functions and rule in a tyrannical fashion. 73 Hence it was suggested that 
power be divided into several offices so that it each would check each other. and 
ambition would counteract ambition.
7
~ The resulting tripartite division government 
would have symmetry of form ensuring preservation of individual liberty.
75 
The separation of powers does not merely argue that the fusion of government powers 
gives rise to the possibility of tyranny, rather the fusion of the power to legislate. govern 
and judge is the definition of tyranny itself, and is mutually exclusive to Jiberty.
76 Thi is 
because the combination of these three basic functions of government in one body will 
necessarily give autocratic powers to that body. Thus however. prett) the statute boo" 
70 Montesquieu The Spiri1 of 1he La11 •s book Xl eh -l- para 2 in AM Cohler, BC liller. and H S Stone (ed 
and trans) Cambridge Texts in 1he His1ory of Political Thought (Cambridge Uni\ ersit) Press. Cambridge ) 
155-156. 
7 1 See Montesqu ieu The Spiri1 of The Lll\\S boo!-. XI eh -l- para l - 2 in AM Cohler, BC :-1Iiler. and H S 
Stone (eds and trans) Cambridge Tex1s in the Hislory of Political Thought (Cambridge Universit) Pre s. 
Cambridge) 155 - 156: Madison Federalis1 -17 in S F Mittell (eel) The Federalisr ( ational Home Libr,lr) 
Foundation, Washington DC, 1961) 313. 
72 M JC Vile Cons1i11aiona/is111 and the Separmion of Po1vers (C larendon Press, Oxford. 1967) 93. 
73 Madison Federalist 47 in S F Mittell (ed) Th e Federalisr (National Home Library Foundation, 
Washington DC, 1961 ) 313. It is noted that there is substantial debate as to the aceuraC) of these labels Ill 
contemporary government. This will in pan be discussed below in when discussing suggested 
modifications of New Zealand's constitution. For a detailed discussion of a functional analysis see M JC 
Vile Co11sti1111ionalis111 and the Separation of Poll'ers (Clarendon Press , Oxford. 1967) 29-l- - 315. 
74 Madison Federalist 51 in S F Mittell (ed) The Federalisr (National Home Librar) Foundauon. 
Washington DC, 1961 ) 337. 
75 Madison Federalist 47 in S F Mittell (ed) The Federalist (National Home Library Foundation, 
Washington DC. 1961 ) 3 12 -3 13. 
76 Montesquicu The Spinr of 1he Lall'.\ boo !-. XI eh 6 paras 4 - 6 in AM Cobler.BC Miller. and H S tone 
(eds and trans) Cambridge Texrs in rhe Hisrory of Political T/1ouf?lll ( ambndge Uni\ers1t) Press. 
Cambridge) 157. 
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may look, tyranny will always be the practical implication,77 a truth that Professor Bruce 
Ackerman described as "common sense ."78 
The separation of powers does not so much act to prevent the possibility of tyrannical 
government coming to power, 79 as to form the basis of a constitution, which if 
maintained, will not permit a government in an autocratic function . For example, the 
considerable degree of separation of powers in the Weimar Republic did not stop 
absolutist Nazi regime from coming to power. 80 Rather constitutional government in the 
Weimar Republic was ended by the legislature giving the cabinet power to deviate from 
the constitution at its leisure and to revoke acts at the demand of the Reichstag, 8 1 and 
later giving cabinet unlimited power to determine matters of constitutional law. 82 
The crucial point is , that in order to become an absolutist power, the Nazi party 
effectively abolished any meaningful separation of powers. 83 Thus separation of powers 
on its own is not self-perpetuating. However, the lack of divided governmental power is 
a necessary precondition to absolutist government. 
The basis of the separation of powers then is to provide a system of government in 
which a tyrannical government cannot exist and liberty will be preserved. 8-i Under a 
strict theory of separation of powers of the amalgamation of any two bodies of 
government creates a situation in which liberty cannot exist. 85 Thus a central point of the 
77 B Ackerman "The New Separati on of Powers" (2000) 11 3 Harv L Rev 63-+. 689. 
78 B Ackerman , above. 689. 
79 
M JC Vile Co11S1irll/i0Halis111 and rh e Separario11 of Po11 ·ers (Clarendon Press, Oxford . 1967) 310. 
80 
AT Vanderbitt Th e Docrrine of rh e Separar/011 of Powers and irs ?resew Day Si~111fica 11ce (U ni vers11 1 
of Nebraska Press , Nebraska, 1953), 13 - 17. 
81 Law for the Relief of the People and of Reich Act of 1933 , cited in A T Vanderbilt Th e Docrrine of rhe 
Separation of Powen a!ld its Presenr Day Significance (U ni versity of Nebraska Press . Nebraska. I 953 ). I . 
82 Law for the Reconstruction of the Reich Act 193-t , cited in A T Vanderbilt The Docrruze of 1he 
Separation of Powers and its Present Day Sigllljtcmzce (University of Nebraska Press, Nebraska, 1953), 17. 
83 AT Vanderbitt The Doctrine of rhe Separmion of Powers a!ld irs Present Day Significance (University 
of Nebraska Press , Nebraska. 1953 ), I 3 - I 7. 
8
-1 E Barendt "Separation or Powers and Constitutional Government" [ 1995] PL 599, 60 I. 
85 Montesquieu Th e Spin! of Th e Lmvs book Xl , eh 6. para-+ - 12 in AM Cohler. B C Miller . and H S 
Stone (eels and trans) Cambridge Te:as in rhe Hisrory of Polirical Thought (Cambridge Uni versity Press. 
Cambridge) 157 - 158. 
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separation of powers 1s that liberty. and a tyrannical government of fused powers are 
mutually exclusive. 
Recently though, the traditional rationale for the separation of powers of preserving 
liberty has come under criticism. N W Barber86 proposes that the core goal of the 
doctrine is not liberty , but efficiency. 87 Barber's central objection to the liberty rationale 
seems to be that it would mean that the three powers would have to be more evenly 
balanced than they are in England. implying that the courts would need to have 
substantially more power than they cuJTently do, probably having the power to strike 
down Acts of Parliament. 88 It is accepted that Barber is corTect insofar as he argues that 
the separation of powers requires courts to have increased power. 89 However. thi s is an 
effect of the doctrine rather than an argument that it has a basis other than liberty. 
While. as Barber notes. Locke did establi sh some theoreti cal basis for the efficiency 
rationale,
90 
it is submitted that this does no more than provide a supplementary basis of 
the doctrine. As Vile has shown,91 an analysis with which Barber agrees, 92 Locke was 
also concerned with the protection of liberty. Hence, although not without dispute. the 
domin ant view of commentators, endorsed by the author, is that the preservation of 
liberty is the touch stone of the separation of powers. 
D. Problems With Previous Conceptions of the Separations of Powers. 
Particularly in the last century, with the nse of the welfare state, the role of 
government has changed dramati ca lly . Therefore, changing ideals and requirements of 
government must be considered when usin g the separation of powers to critique a modern 
constitution. 
86 See Barber's anic le on thi s point: N W Barber ·'Prelude to the Separation of Powers·· I 200 I J CLJ 59. 
87 N W Barber .. Prelude to the Separation of Powers" [2001] CLJ 59, 59. 
88 N W Barber, above, 62. 
89 See Pan TV B Expanding the Power of the Judiciary below. 
90 N W Barber .. Prelude to the Separa ti on of Powers" 1200 I J CLJ 59, 63 - 66 . 
9 1 M J C Vi le Co11srir111 io11alis111 and rh e Separarion of Poil'ers (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967) 63 - 7-1 . 
91 N W Barber, above, 63 
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The rise of the welfare state and concepts of social justice mean that demands are 
now just for freedom .fi'om government but also demand for government to deal with 
pressing social and economic problems. 93 Strict separations of powers and strong checks 
can be quite detrimental to efforts to help prevent private business abusing their market 
position at the detriment of citizens. 9.J This was demonstrated in l 918 when the SC 
struck down a statute enforcing an eight-hour working day for children as 
unconstitutional .95 
Hence. it is apparent th at in today's society where government serves a vital 
protective role it is necessary to have a government that is strong enough to protect 
people 's interests. In the USA this was at least in part resolved by the strengthening of 
the Presidency through Presidents such as Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D Roosevelt. 96 
When considered against first principles thi s is entirely appropriate. The object of the 
separation of powers is to preserve liberty. 97 Hence, a reduced separation of powers or a 
reconfiguration of the balance between the powers to maximise liberty fits within the 
purpose of the doctrine. Whether giving effect to the purpose of protecting liberty leads 
to a strengthening or a weakening of government is merel y the result of thi s analysis. 98 
In response to the need for efficient government and increased com pli cation in th e 
modern administrative state, modern theo ries of the separation of powers no longer c ling 
to the tripartite division of government.99 It is no longer possible to advocate a pure 
separation of powers. even if tempered with a theory of checks and baJances. 100 
93 M J C Vile Constitutiona/is111 and 1!,e Separation of Powers (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967) 264. 
94 M J C Vile, above, 263. 
95 Wilson v Receivers of 1he Missouri, Oklahoma & Gulf Railway Company (1918) 234 US 332 (USSC). 
The need of governmental protection in New Zea land can be seen in the enactment of the Commerce Act 
1986, whi ch intends to prevem abusive use of dominant market pos iti on. 
96 M JC Vile. above, 27 1 - 272,276 - 278: AT Vanderbilt The Doc1ri11e of 1he Separa1io11 of Powers and 
ifs Present Day Sigllljicance (U ni versit y of Nebraska Press, Nebraska , 1953), 73. 
97 See Pan II A above. 
98 The appropriate balance in ew Zea land is the subj ect of Part V Constitut io nal Reforms to Remed y 
Breaches of the Separation of powers below. 
99 See M JC Vile, above, 3 15 - 350; B Ackerman ''The New Separation of Powers" (2000) 11 3 Harv L 
Rev 63 -1 , 727 - 729 . 
100 M J C Vile, above, 3 17. 
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f I "f . I IOI Furthermore, structures o government are now mu t1 unct1ona . For example if 
administrators are to be consistent they have to decide cases, create some sort of rules to 
act consistently, and implement decisions. 102 In short they must exercise all three 
functions. 103 Similar arguments apply to the judicial function if judicial decisions are to 
be consistent. 10.i Therefore. it is not possible to argue for a separation of powers in all 
cases because it becomes too hard to categorise every governmental function into one of 
the three branches. 105 
E. The Modern Requirements of the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers. 
While some have argued that the problems with the separat ion of powers have 
removed the relevance or the doctrine. 106 thi s is an oveITeaction. There is no need to 
. . I . r 101 1ns1st on a tota separation o powers. The basic idea is sound . on ly its full 
implementation is no longer possible or desirable. 108 The following points remain 
valuable insights into constitutional design that are still salient in contemporary society. 
1. Protecting Liberry. 
Liberty rema rn s a concern of soc iety and the touchstone of the separation of 
109 powers. The issue is not whether liberty is desirable but how the balance should be 
struck between protecting liberty and all ow ing effec tive government. The separat ion of 
powers will necessarily determine how thi s balance is struck. If government is fused and 
101 M J C Vile Constitutionalis111 a11.d the Separation of Poll'ers (Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1967) 317 . 102 M J C Vile, above, 319. 
103 M JC Vi le, above, 319. 
10
~ M JC Vile. above, 318. 
10
' M J C V il e. above. 3 15 - 350: B d.erman "Tbe New Separation of Powers·· (2000) 11 3 Han L Re, 
634, 727 - 729: W Barber "Prelude to the Separat ion of Powers" l200 I ] CLJ 59: G Palmer Unbrul/ed 
Power (2"d ed, Oxford Uni versity Press, Auckland, 1987) 7. 
106 P A Joseph Constitutional and Ad111in is1rati11e Law in Ne1v Zea land (2"d edn, Butterwonhs. Wellington. 
200 1, See also the attempt to find a new rationale in N W Barber "Prelude to the Separation of Powers" 
[2001 l CLJ 59. 
107 M J C Vile, above, 3 15 - 350; B Ackerman , above, 727 - 729; N W Barber, above, 59; G Palmer, 
above, 7. 
108 E Barencl t "Separation of Powers and Consti tutional Government" [ 1995] PL 599, 60 l and 605 - 608 . 
109 E Barendt, above, 599 . 
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consolidated without effective checks then there can be little practical protection of 
liberty. The key task in using the separation of powers in constitutional analysis is to 
determine whether the Constitution under consideration has too much fusion of power. 
and too inadequate checks on power to protect liberty. 
2. Balanced Government. 
Modern theories of the separation of powers do not strive to separate power totally; 110 
indeed it has been powerfully argued that a properly limited system of parliamentary 
government is acceptable under the separation of powers. 111 The key is to create a 
system where all bodies of government check and balance each other, partly by their 
separation and partly by their inte1Telationships in the form of checks so that no one body 
may exercise its power in an autocratic fashion. 
The focus is not to categorise government into three branches and divide it along 
those lines. Rather, the key for separation of powers in the modern state is to create 
balance within government avoiding concentrations of power. 112 This necessaril y 
requires a balancing of the main bodies of government. 113 
The basic aim remains the same; to avoid concentrations of power. 114 Hence the 
legislature executive and judicial branches should be balanced so that they counteract 
each other. While the three branches should maintain a degree of separation from each 
other, they should also retain a certain degree of control over each other to ensure that no 
one branch exercises too much power. As between the three central branches of 
government the crucial issue is how they balance each other in the division of power. 
' 
3. £rrernal Checks and Bulonces. 
110 E Barendt .. Separation of Powers and Con~u wuonal Governrnen1 ·· [ 1995 J PL 599, 607. 
111 See B Ackerman .. The New Separation of Powers" (2000) 11 3 I-larv L Rev 63-L E Barendt ··Separation 
of Powers and Constitutional Government" [l995J PL 599,607. 
112 E Barendt, above, 607. 
11 3 See M JC Vile Cons1it11tionalis111 and the Separnrion of Powers (Claren Ion Press. Oxford, 1967) 335. 
11
.i E Barend1, above. 607 . 
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Modern administrative controls such as the Ombudsmen , which do not fit within the 
traditional governmental division , are also important as a limitation on governmental 
power. Because these bodies control the exercise of governmental power the role of 
these bodies must be considered in assessing the level of balance that should be struck 
between the three central branches of the state. Such administrative controls are essential 
in assessing the degree of balance within the constitution. Balance can not only be 
provided by the relationship between the three principle branches of government, but also 
by the external administrative bodies which check the excess of government. 
Hence the comments of Mulgan that the purpose of limiting government is better 
served by ex tern al checking agencies 115 mis-appreciates modem conceptions of the 
separation of powers . Under the conception of the separation of powers proposed in this 
paper the checks Mulgan proposes are part of the doctrine of the separation of powers. 116 
The modern separation of powers argues for much more than the separation of the 
traditional three branches of government. 117 
F. Concluding Remarks. 
A pure separation of powers whether or not supplemented by checks and balances 
strictly applied cannot be an adequate tool to analyse a modern constitution. However, 
the basic aspirations of the separation of powers remain apposite to constitutional 
analysis. The focus of the doctrine has expanded. The touchstone remains checking 
power to prevent its arbitrary use thereby promoting liberty. 
The analysis should begin with the inten-elationship between the three branches of 
the state. However, it must also extend to the consideration of checks on the three 
115 R Mulgan Polilics in New Zealand (2"d edn , Auckland University Press, 1997) 70 - 71. 116 B Ackerman ''The New Separation of Powers" (2000) 11 3 Harv L Rev 634, 639. 117 It is also respectfull y argued that Mulgan is incorrect to dismiss the separati on of powers as an argument 
for rearranging the main bodies of government. As 1s discussed 1n Part V Cons t!luti onal Reform~ to 
Remedy Breaches of the Separation of Powers, a better apphcauon of the separation of power\ can 1mpr0\e 
the New Zealand constituti on. 
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braches of government that are external to the separation of powers, in order for the 
separations to be considered in context. Therefore analysis under the separation of 
powers urges a broad enquiry focusing on whether constitutional a1Tangements are 
ff. · l"b 118 su 1c1ent to protect 1 erty. 
Ill. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW ZEALAND CONSTITUTION AGAINST THE 
DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS. 
A. Fusions of Power in the New Zealand Constitution. 
While the New Zealand Constitution is not without checks on the exercise of state 
power, these must be considered in light of the overwhelming fusion of power in the 
central bodies of the state. Because it is these central organs that they must check. it is 
necessary to first appreciate the power of the central government. 
1. Cabinet Government. 
Cabinet Government is at the root of the principal offences to the separation of 
powers m ew Zealand. Cabinet is a body created by convention consisting of the senior 
ministers of the governing party/parties. 119 Although the precise number of Cabinet 
members fluctuates. the number is usuall y around 20. 120 Because all ministers are part of 
the executive and ministers must be members or Parliament ( .. MPs .. ) by law. 121 the 
leading members of the executive branch must all be MPs. 
118 B Ackerman '·The New Separation of Powers" (2000) 113 Harv L Rev 634, 639. 
119 G Palmer and M Palmer Bridled Po1Ver: Nell' Zealand Government Under MMP (3 ed Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1997) 5. Note also that in addition to Cabinet ministers there will also be 
ministers who are not pan of Cabinet. 
120 J Boston The F11111re of Cabinet Covem111ent in New Zealand: The implications of MMP for tlie 
Formation Organi-::,aiion. and Operations of Cabinet (GSBGM Publicati ons, Wellington. 1994) 8. 12 1 Constitution Act 1986, section 6. 
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However, it is not the direct fusion of legislative and executive powers in ministers. 
so much as the control that Cabinet exercises over Parliament, that offends the separation 
of powers. As Walter Bagehot described Cabinet: 122 
A cabinet is a combining committee - a hyphen which joins , a buckle which fastens. the legislative 
part of the state to the executive part of the state. In its origin it belongs to the one, in its functions 
it belongs to the other. 
While the Westminster system as Bagehot knew it depended on MPs voting 
according to their judgment, 123 the rise of the party system, Caucus and party discipline. 
now forces MPs to vote along party lines. 12-1 Hence, Bagehot's description has come to 
be a very accurate description of the modern Cabinet. 125 The tight functioning of party 
discipline and parties' openly stated objective of capturing and controlling Parliament 
means that Cabinet exercises a huge amount of control over Parliament. 126 
Cabinet's power stems from the process of governmental decision-making. Decisions 
are first made secretly in Cabinet. 127 After Cabinet makes its decision all members of 
Cabinet are bound by the convention of collective responsibility to support Cabinet 's 
decision. 128 Provided a Prime Minister is in a secure position. breaches of collective 
responsibility will usually result in the forced resignation of the member who speaks out 
against the government's policies. 129 For example Derek Quigley lost his position for 
criticising the ·'Think Big project." 130 Similarly, despite some delay , Winston Peters was 
also forced to leave Cabinet after criticising government decisions in 1992. 131 
122 W Bagehot Th e English Cons1i1111ion (Garland Publishing. London. 197 ) 14 123 G Palmer New Zealand 's Cons/i{/{rion in Crisis (John Mcindoe, Dunedin , 1992) 103. 12
~ G Palmer. above,103. 
12
' G Palmer. above, 105. 
126 G Palmer, above, 130. 
m G Palmer and M Palmer Bridled Po11 ·er: Ne11 · Zealand Co vem111en1 Under MMP (3 ed. udland 
University Press. Auckland , 1997) 62 . 
128 R Mulgan Poli1ics in Ne11 • Zealwul (211d edn, Auckland Uni versity Pre!>S, Auckland, 1997) 7. 129 R Mulgan, above, 87 . 
130 R Mulgan, above, 88. 
131 R Mulgan, above, 88 
22 
The next level of decision-making is made in Caucus (all the MPs of the party ). by 
majority vote at a private weekly meeting. 132 However, once a decision reaches Caucus 
Cabinet will have already reached a decision, and by dint of collective responsibility will 
speak with one voice in Caucus. Furthermore, Cabinet members will normally be the 
most senior and influential party members. Therefore when Caucus comes to make a 
decision it will be significantly influenced by the views of the 20 most senior members in 
the party who have all reached the same conclusion. Hence it is highly unlikely that 
Caucus will challenge cabinet decisions. 
Once Caucus has come to a decision. all the members of the party are bound by 
extremely tight party discipline to vote for that decision in Parliament. 133 In contrast to 
other party systems such as in the United Kingdom virtually every piece of legislation put 
before Parliament is whipped, meaning that the party member must vote for it or beware 
the consequences. 134 
The result of this streamlined decision-making process is that Cabinet will generally 
control the voting of however many seats the ruling party or coalition has in the House. 
Because of the tight regime of party di sc ipline, the seniority of cabinet ministers and the 
fact that Cabinet will speak with one voice in Caucus, Cabinet largely decides the content 
of Bills , and will almost always have the support of the party to ensure their passage. 135 
After Fir::.gerald ,. Mulc/0011 136 it is c lear that Ministers cannot suspend law without 
legislative authority. 137 However. the influence, bordering on control. that the executive 
exercises over the legislature via cabinet means that the executive can use Parliament to 
132 G Palmer Nell' Zealand's Co11s1i1111ion in Crisis (John Mclndoe, Dunedin, 1992) 106. 
133 G Palmer Ne11· Zealand's Co11sti111/io11111 Cnsis (John Mclndoe, Dunedin, 1992) 106. 
134 G Palmer. above. 1-ll . Wbile parties 111 the United Kingdom will whip most leg1slat1on . there 1, a 
graded system of wh1pp1ng wh ich allows more nex1bil1t)' than the Ne1,1, Zealand 1,, hipped or not -11 hipped 
regime. 
135 M JC Vile Co11 sti1u1io11alism and rile Sepomrion of Powen (Clarendon Press. 0;-..ford. 1967) 227. 
136 Fitzgerald v Muldoon [ 19761 2 NZLR 615 . 
137 For emphasis on the importance of thi s po1n1 see G Palmer .. e" Zealand and the Glorious Revolut1un" 
[ 19971 NZLJ 265. 
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change the law. Thus Cabinet fuses executive and legislative power in a way that aJlows 
the executive to control Parliament. 
Under the old First Past the Post ("'FPP") electoral system the power of Cabinet was 
extremely pronounced. Because FPP was biased towards single party majority 
government, 
138 
Cabinet, by virtue of the decision making process outlined above, would 
generally be able to control majority support in the House . Thus in the usual state of 
affairs, Cabinet would have virtuall y total control over both the executive and legi s lati ve 
branches of government. 
The result was that we had a monolithic government, restrained only by the blunt 
. f . . ·1 1 . 139 instrument o tnenma e ect1ons. In between elections the only restraint on the 
government was maintaining enough popularity to recapture more than half the house. 
which , because of FPP ' s bias towards major parties would not even require a majority of 
the popular vote.
140 
Electoral politics had essentially replaced Parliamentary politics, 141 
making Parliament a rubber stamp for the executive. 142 and destroying the balance and 
symmetry that might otherwise exist within the Constitution. 143 As was said in 1992: 144 
[T]here is a lack of balance between the three components of the system - the executive, 
Parliament and the courts. The situation now is one of overwhelming executi ve power. New 
Zea land prides itse lf on being a democ rac) . but the sys tem of government 1~ ~uch that the claim 1s 
somewhat holl ow. ft is true that we have elec ti ons, but what do they determine·> ... The cm i, of 
the New Zealand Constitution lies in the malclistribution of power between its component pans. 
Under MMP, although single party majority governments are still possible, the most 
likely types of government under MMP are single part minority governments. or 
138 J Bos ton The Future of Cabi11 e1 Covemmelll in New Zealand: The implications of MM P fo r 1he 
Formation Orga11i-::.atio11 and Opera1io11s of Cabinel (GSBGM Publi cati ons, Wellington, 1994) 3. 
139 G Palmer New Zealand 's Co11 sli1Lt1 io11 in Crisis (John Mclndoe, Dunedin, 1992) 135. 
1•0 See the anal ys is of electoral results in G Palmer Unbridled Power: An lmerpreta1io11 of New Zealand 's 
Consti1111ion and Govemmelll (2 ed , Oxford U ni versity Press , Oxford , 1987) 242 - 243 . 
1• 1 G Palmer New Zealand 's Consti1111io11 in Crisis (J ohn Mclndoe, Dunedin , 1992) 129. 
142 G Palmer, above, 143. 
143 M JC Vile Co1lS!il11tio11alism Cllld the Separcaion of Powers (Clarendon Press . Oxford, 1967) 228 - 229 . 
1~4 G Palmer, above, 12. 
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coalitions who have either a majority or minority in Parliament. 145 Therefore. the degree 
of fusion which was formerly present under FPP will generally not exist in MMP 
Parliaments. 
Particularly in minority governments parties will enjoy substantially less control than 
they previously had. In a minority government the executive no longer has de facto 
control over the legislature. 146 Consequentially if the Government wants to pass 
l . l . f h . 147 legislation it must find support in the house for the eg1s at1on rom ot er parties. 
Therefore, a genuine distinction can now be drawn between Parli ament and the executive. 
The possibility of a majority coalition government complicates matters somewhat. If 
there is a majority coalition, then so long as the coalition holds together, Cabinet can 
function much as it did under FPP. with the caveat that the coalition will probably be 
harder to hold together than a party because of the diverse interests in the coalition. 14h 
The extent of the Cabinet's power though will depend on the nature of the coalition. 1.i9 
However. the extent that MMP has separated executive and legi slative power by 
removing some of the executive's de facto control over Parliament should not be 
overstated. Although under MMP single majority governments are unlikely, Cabinet, by 
definition. will be made up of the party that can control the House on matters of 
confidence and supply, whether alone, in coalition, or as a minority government. 
Therefore. a substantial degree of control over Parliament is inherent in a parliamentary 
system, even under MMP. Additionally, a strong coalition would probably allow the 
system to function much as it did under FPP. 
Furthermore. because Proportional Representation (" PR" ) legitimises partie~ by 
g1vmg them their respective representation in the house directly. rather than through 
145 J Boston The F11t11re of Cabi11e1 Co1•e m111e111 in New Zealc111d: The i111p/1ccuio11s of MM P for The 
For111ation Organi-:.caion and Opera1io11s of Cabinet (GSBGM Publications. Wellington . 1994) 3. 
146 J Boston , above, 7. 
147 J Boston, above, 7. 
14
~ J Boston. above, 7. 
149 J Boston , above, 7. 
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members, party discipline is unlikely to decline. 150 Thus while Cabinet's influence is 
diluted, Cabinet remains an exceedingly influential body. Indeed. Professor Joseph 
argues that MMP has only required new political management ski ll s from politicians. 1) 1 
Hence while MMP alleviate some of the separation of powers issues of 
parliamentary government, it is not a cure-all. 152 Even with a minority government there 
is still an uncomfortable degree of fusion of powers, and in that there is little to stop a 
coalition forming which will have the same monolithic nature as FPP Cabinets. While 
MMP has changed the process of decision-making and sometimes the outcome of 
decisions, the basic structure of Cabinet government still remains. Therefore, 
notwithstanding improvements under MMP the effect of Cabinet government is to 
destroy much of the balance and symmetry that might otherwise exist between the 
legislative and executive branch. 
2. Uncontrolled Law Making. 
1n New Zealand the legi slative branch consists of a single House of Representatives 
and the Governor General, 153 which has "fu ll power" to make laws in New Zealand. 1)-1 
Under the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy the power of Parliament is entirely 
without restraint. Hence the power of Parliament, at least on a positivist view, 1s 
absolute. 
Alone the unchecked nature or the legis lature is dangerous because the legislature can 
unilaterally dictate the terms of the constitution. In such a situation Parliament 
overbalances the other branches of government. Cabinet control over Parliament makes 
the problem worse. This uniting of Parliament and the executive means that the already 
150 B Ackerman "The New Separation of Powers·· 11 3 Han Law Rev 633, 665. 
151 
P A Joseph Co11s1i1111ional and Ad111inis1m1il'e urn• in New Zealand (2 ed, Butterworths. Wellington. 
200 I) 2..J.6. Thi~ ma) 111 fact be undeNat1ng the po~1t1011 
1
'
2 
G Palmer & M Palmer Bmlled Pu11 ·er - Ne1r Lea/and Cu1 ·en1111 e111 Lnder MMP (3 ed. 0\lurd 
University Press, Auckland, 1997) 307. 
153 
PA Joseph Co11S1illl11onal and Ad111i11is1rl11i1•e Lall' in New Zealand (2"0 ed, Bunerworth~. Well111gto11 . 
2001) 237. 
154 Constitution Act 1986, s 15. 
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overbearing power of Parliament not only is not balanced by an independent executive, 
but is in fact controlled by the executive. In this situation balance cannot and does not 
exist. 
To a large extent, the concept of the sovereignty of Parliament owes its origins to 
Thomas Hobbes. 155 Hobbes· theories are best understood in the context in which he 
lived, directly after the English civil war. 156 Hobbes' aversion to war can probably best 
be seen in Chapter XIII of Leviathan, where Hobbes said that in times of war there : 157 
[I/s no place for industry: because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the 
Earth: no Navigation .. no Know ledge of the face of the Earth: no account of Time: no Arts: no 
Letters : no Society' and which is worst of all, continuall feare. and danger of violent death: And 
the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty brutish, and short. 
It is against this abject fear of war that Hobbes ' constitutional thought should be 
considered. 
Hobbes advocated a sovereign that was powerful enough to maintain a state of 
peace.
15 8 
In Hobbes' words "a Kingdome divided in its selfe cannot stand." 159 Thi s 
unification of power was embodied in the powers of a Sovereign. which were essentially 
unlimited. Hobbes' Sovereign was unquestionably supreme over essentially all 
155 G Palmer New Zealand's Co11s1it 111ion in Crisis: Refor111i11g our Political Sys1e111 (John M cindoe. 
Dunedin, 1992) 42 - 43. For the work of Hobbes, see in particular Hobbes ' principal work Levia1ha11, T 
Hobbes Leviathan in R Tuck (ed) Cambridge Texts i11 The History of Political Thought: Hobbes Leviathan 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 1996). 
156 R Tuck ·'Introduction·· in R Tuck (ed) Cambridge Tex1s in The History of Poli1ical Thouglu: Hobbes 
Leviathan (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996) x - xi; M J Sodaro Comparative Politics: A 
Global illtroductio11 (McGraw Hill, New York, 2001) 122. 
157 Hobbes Lel'icaha11 XIII. 62 in R Tuck (ed) Cambridge Te.win The History of Political Tho11gh1: Hobbes 
Levicahan (Cambridge University Pre s. Cambridge. 1996) 89 (original spelling and grammar preserved). 
158 Hobbes Lei•iatha11 XVII. 85 111 R Tuck (eel) Cambridge Texts in The HisIOn of Po!i1ical Tho11gh1: 
Hobbes Leviwhan (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, 1996) 11 7. 
159 Hobbes Leviathan XVIII, 93 in R Tuck (ed) Ca111bridge Tex1s in The f-!is101y of Poli1ical Tho11gh1: 
Hobbes Levia1han (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 1996) 127 (original spelling and grammar 
preserved). 
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matters, 160 controlled all of the branches of government, 161 and could do as it liked to a 
subject without injustice or injury because every subject is the author of every action of 
h · 16? t e sovereign. -
It is no criticism of Hobbes himself to say that his theories are out of place in ew 
Zealand in the twenty-first century. Hobbes was responding in a decisive manner to 
years of civil war between King and Parliament. Given the dramatically different context 
between today and Hobbes ' time, the continuing validity of Hobbes' emphasis on the 
unlimited powers of the sovereign requires careful scrutiny. 
While arguments still persist that Parliament should remain unchecked in its 
lawmaking power, 163 two recent examples are sufficient to demonstrate the potentially 
abusive nature of the unchecked nature of the powers of Parliament. 
The Criminal Justice Amendment Act ( o 2) 1999 had the potential effect of 
retrospectively increasing the maximum prison sentences of people who had committed 
murder in the context of home invasion. Where Section 82(2A) applied, the Judge was 
required to impose a prison sentence of not less than 13 years, notwithstanding the fact 
that the offence was committed at a date before the duty to impose the minimum period 
existed. 16.i 
As Thomas J noted the legislation was very close to being (if it was not in fact) a bill 
of attainder.
165 
There was only a small group of people affected by the section whose 
names were readily available, and it would be unsurprising for Parliament to have known 
160 
See the desc ription of the sovereign 's powers in Hob bes LeFiathan XV1ll in R Tuck (ed) Cambridge 
Texts in The History of Political Though1: Hobbes Leviathan (Cambridge University Press , Cambridge. 
1996) 121 - 129. 
161 
Hobbes Levimhan XVIII, 91 - XVIII. 93 in R Tuck (ed) Cambridge Te.w i11 The Hiswrr of Po/inca/ 
Though1 : Hobbes Levic11ha11 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 1996) 125 - 127. 
162 
Hobbes Leviathan XXI. 109 in R Tuck (ed) Cambridge Tex1s i11 The History of Poli1ica/ Thour:!11: 
Hobbes Le1·w1ha 11 (Cambridge University Pre~~. Cambridge, 1996) l-t8. 
163 
For example ~ee J Allen "No to a Written Consrirution" in C James (ed) Buildi11g 1he Co11sru111w11 
(lnstitute of Policy Studies, Wellington. 2000) 391; and J McLean "Legislative Invalidation, Human Right~ 
Protection and s 4 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act" [2001] NZ Law Review 421 , 448. 
164 RV Pora [2001 l 2 NZLR 37, [25] (CA) Elias CJ. 
165 R v Poumako [2000] 2 NZLR 695, 712 (CA) Thomas J. 
28 
who would be affected. 166 Thus, Parliament effectively exercised a judicial function by 
prescribing a punishment, retrospectively no less. for a select group of people. 167 Despite 
the warning of Thomas J to the government not to provoke the Court into a constitutional 
conflict, 168 there was no question of the validity of the provision, although the worst of it~ 
ff I . l . . d 169 e ects were u t1mate y m1t1gate . 
Similarly, Parliament showed its power in passing legislation in anticipation of the 
pending decision in Taito v R. 170 The legislation was intended to retrospectively make all 
illegal and invalid determinations of appeals and applications for appeal valid. 171 Thus 
rather than let the Judiciary apply the law, Parliament passed a law effectively judging 
the status of a group of individual s. 172 
Although the full effect of the two Acts mentioned were reduced and nullified by the 
173 
courts. they are indicative of the potential for abuse that can stil I be exercised at 
popular demand. Pursuant to the separation of powers. the Constitution shou ld be 
organised so that such dangers to liberty are eliminated where possible. 
While disturbing, the two preceding examples only show the problems that ha ve 
occurred in New Zealand recently from having an unchecked legislature. Further 
problems arise from the executive·s excessive control over Parliament, and the use of that 
control to pass autocratic legislation. 
166 R v Po11111ako 12000] 2 NZLR 695, 7 13 Thomas J. 
167 R v Po11111ako, above, 7 13 Thomas J. 
168 R v Po11111ako, above, 713 Thomas J. 
169 R V Pora [200 I] 2 ZLR 37 (CA). 
170 Tai10 \' R (2002) 6 HRNZ 539. 
171 
Section 13 Crimes (Criminal Appeals) Amendment Act 200 1. The precise number of people who were 
denied legal aid is unknown. H owever, counse l for Mr Taito (Antony haw) estimates that the number 1~ 
most likely in the thousands. In a twist to the saga the Privy Counci l 's judgment 111 Tai10 1· R. above 11 as 
expressed on much wider terms than Parliament had intended, thus rendering the leg1slauve va l1dauon 
ineffecti ve; R v S111i1h (19 December 2002) Court of Appeal Wellington CA 315/96. 
172 Admiuedl y the group of i ndi victual s affected by the Crimes (Cri m1nal AppeabJ Amendment Act v1 a~ 
much larger than the group affected by the Criminal Justice Amendment Ac t 1999. However, the basic 
nature is constant. 
173 R v Smith , above: RV Pora, above: R \' Po1111wko, above. 
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The paradigm example of constitutionally abusive legislation ignoring all notions of 
the separation of powers was the Clyde Dam saga. Having received a decision from the 
Planning Tribunal ruling against granting the water right necessary to build the Clyde 
Dam, the Government promptly passed the Clutha Development (Clyde Dam) 
Empowering Act 1982, granting itself the rights to build the Dam decisions of the 
Planning Tribunal notwithstanding. 17-1 This demonstrates the power of the executive to 
control Parliament. and in turn control the judiciary. inherent in our unbalanced 
Constitution. 
While MMP makes constitutional abuses such as the Clyde Dam saga less likely. 
there are still insufficient mechanisms to stop the government from depriving people of 
liberty and abusing the rule of Jaw. All MMP does is make abuse less probable. 175 It is 
still too easy for a government to find sufficient numbers in Parliament to pass improper 
legislation. 
The recent Duynhoven saga illustrates that under MMP Parliament can still be used 
for the benefit of a political party. and gives a "little taste" 176 of the dangers of having 
partisan control of unrestrained power. By Sections 4 and 5 of the Electoral Vacancies 
Amendment Act 2003. Parliament. at the behest of the governing Labour part y. 
retroactively suspended section 55( l )(c ) of the Electoral Act I 993 . which provided that 
the seat of any member of Parliament shall become vacant if that member does an y act 
whereby the member becomes entitled to rights privileges or immunities of a foreign 
state. 
Mr Duynhoven (a Labour MP) had unwittingly offended section 55( I )(c ) by 
renewing his Dutch citizenship, and but for the retroactive legislation, would have had to 
174 M Chen and G Palmer Public Lt.111 · 111 Ne11 · Zealand: Cases, M(//erials, Co111111e111,. and Q11es11011 .1 
(Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1993) 60 - 62. 
175 It is readily conceded that no system can provide total protection. However as is argued in thi s part, our 
current safeguards are insufficient. 
176 J Waldron ·· Retroactive Law : Hov. Dodg) was Du ynho \en r (Puhlic Lecture Victoria Un1 vers1t ) nt 
Wellington Law School , Wellington . 21 August 2003 ). 
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vacate his seat. 177 The principal submission made on Mr Duynhoven 's behalf was that 
retroactive legislation confe1Ting a benefit is not objectionable.
178 
However, as Professor 
Waldron has pointed out, confen-ing this benefit on Mr Duynhoven necessarily meant 
that whoever may have otherwise taken Mr Duynhoven's seat would be adversely 
affected, therefore the legislation was not only beneficial. 179 
Even if the legislation was not constitutionally objectionable for its retroactive nature. 
it still demonstrates the disturbing way in which Parliament, under executive control. can 
be used for partisan ends. It should not be forgotten that this was a retroactive change to 
electoral law (an essential part of our Constitution) passed under urgency, giving partisan 
benefit to the governing party.
180 
It is not surprising that Steven Franks of the ACT party 
expressed bitter resentment at the manner in which the legislation was passed. and the 
181 precedent that such conduct sets. 
While this is a comparatively minor example of improper use of Parliament, 182 as 
compared with attempts at redistricting electorates, 183 it illustrates the ability of the 
executive to use Parliament to change the Constitution to suit its own ends without 
pretence of consensus. 
While now subject to increased controls. 18.i delegated legislation is a further means by 
which the executive through its control of Parliament can upset the separation of powers. 
Delegated legislation refers to secondary and tertiary legislation , which derives their 
authority from Acts of Parliament, but is made by the Minister or Minister in Council to 
177 J Waldron ·· Retroactive Law: How Dougy was Du ynhoven·l" (Publi c Lecture Victoria Un1vers 1t y of 
Wellington Law School , Wellington, 21 August 2003). 
178 Submissions by Sir Geoffrey Palmer to the Parliamentary Privileges ommittee quoted 111 J Waldron . 
above. See also J F Burrows Srarllle La11• in New Zealand (3 edn, Butterwonhs. Wellington , 2003 ) -W3 
179 J Waldron, above. 
180 J Waldron , above. 
181 Comments of Steven Franks made at J Waldron , above. Interestingl y Mr Franks expressed less 
objection to the content of the retroactive legis lation. 
182 J Waldron, above. It is also accepted that the degree of objectionabi lity is less than that in the 
Pora!Po11111ako situation. However, the event are st ill clearly unsettling. 
183 See for example the efforts of the Republi can members of the Texas state legi lature to redraw electoral 
district boundaries in their favour; E Walsh K Brulliard .. Hunch Launched Second Flight of Texas 
Democrats" (2 August 2003) Washingron Posr Washington A03. 
is.i See the discussion in part III B 6 Control of Delegated Legislation below. 
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h I I . . A 1. 185 w om t 1e aut 1onsing et re ers. The offence to the separat ion of power is that 
members of the executive, rather than members of the legis lati ve exerci se what is 
. 11 I . I . 186 essent1a y eg1s at1ve power. 
Because of Parliamentary supremacy it is within Parliament' s power to delegate the 
power to make regulations under an Act. 187 The central questions are how much con trol 
Parliament should exercise over delegated legislation , thus retaining its law making 
power, 188 and how much supervision the courts should exercise. 
The most striking example of this in New Zealand was the incredibly broad 
regulation making power conferred under the Economic Stabilisation Amendment Act 
1982, which effectively allowed the government to rul e by regulation .189 '·Henry VIII 
clauses," such as parts of th e Economic Stabilisation Amendment Act, give rise to further 
problems by providing for the possibility of making delegated legislation that wi ll 
overpower Acts of Parliament. 190 
While Henry VIII c lauses as wide as those in the Economic Stabilisation Amendment 
Act have been discouraged, 
191 
both Henry VIII c lauses and excessive delegations of 
power raise separation of powers iss ues . Delegations that are so wide as to be legis lati ve 
in character have the effect of transfeJTing legi slative authority to the executive branch. 
This is particularly true with Henry VIII clauses, as when exercising such powers the 
executive will not be bound to obey listed acts. 
185M Chen and G Tanner Delega1ed Leg is/a1io11 (New Zealand Law Society Seminar, Wellington, 2002) 3. 
186 Note that the Interpretation Ac t 1999 includes regulations as we ll as Acts in the defimt1on of 
"enactment" in s 29. 
187 M Chen and G Tanner Delegmecl Leg isla1io11 , above, 4 7. 
188 G Palmer "Deficiencies in New Zea land Delegated Legi slation·· ( 1999) 29 VUWLR I , 2. 189 P A Joseph Cons1it111io11a/ and Ac/111i11is1rative Lt11v in Ne11· Zealand (2 11c1 ed, Butterwonhs, Wellington, 
2001) 247. 
190 M Chen and G Tanner, above, 47. 
191 Regulations Review Committee "Inquiry into the Resource Management (Transi t1 onal ) Regulauons 
1994 and the principles that should app ly to the use of empowering provisions all owing regulauons to 
override primary legis lati on during a transitional period" [ 1995] AJHR I 16 , I 5. The government 
genera ll y agreed with the recommended limited use of Henry VIII clauses R Malone Regulmion~ Rel'teH" 
Co111111i1tee Dig es1 (New Zea land Centre for Public Law, Wellington , 2003) 65 - 66. 
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Therefore, to the extent that the executive controls Parliament, it can first create law 
to suit its own ends. This is not to say that checks do not exist in our constitution. 
However it is against this background of fused executive and legislative power that the 
effectiveness of the checks and balances in our Constitution must be analysed. 
B. Checks and Balances in the New Zealand Constitution. 
Owing to space constraints not all of the checks on governmental power can be 
covered in this paper. However, six areas have been given detailed treatment; democratic 
restraints , the Official Information Act 1982 ('"OIA"). the Ombudsmen, judicial 
interpretation of constitutionally offensive legislation , judicial review of executive action , 
and controls over delegated legislation. 192 
I. Democratic Restraints. 
The primary control over government in ew Zealand is the need to maintain 
electoral support. 193 This is driven first by the electoral process itself.19.i If a party vvant:, 
to be re-elected at the next election then they must ensure that their policies are popular 
enough to ensure renewal of the party's tenure. Hence. overall strategy for all parti es 1s 
determined by a desire to win the next election. 195 In the first instance this will prevent 
many unpopular proposals from being implemented. 196 This in itself is an important 
check on power. 
Further, Parliament plays a central role in this aspect of the democratic process as the 
key institution of democratic accountability, where the government is regularly obliged to 
answer for their actions. 197 Parliament is the focal point for public opinion outside of 
192 Other checks on the state include the Police Complaints Authorit y. the Human Ri ghts Commiss ion. the 
Parliamentary Commiss ioner for the Environment, and the Pri vacy Comm1ss1oner. 
193 R Mulgan Politics in New Zealand (211" ed, A uckland Uni versity Press, Auckland. 1997) 70. 
194 R Mulgan. above. 70. 
195 R Mulgan , above, 265 . 
196 R Mulgan, above, 266. 
197 R Mulgan, abo, e, 99. 
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election campaigns. and is the primary venue for the opposition to attack government 
I
. · 198 po 1c1es. 
Challenging government policies in Parliament acts as a continual restraint on 
government. Cabinet depends on the continuing support of backbench members to retain 
its control over Caucus and therefore over Parliament. 199 As all MPs will be 
continuously focused on winning the next election, Cabinet is always exposed to a 
backbench revolt if the party's popularity drops too much.
200 Even dominating leaders 
such as Margaret Thatcher were subject to this phenomenon. 201 Therefore. the imminent 
threat of elections serves to constantly check ministers from taking unpopular actions. 
Ministerial responsibility also places an ongorng check on Cabinet members . 
Ministerial responsibility obliges ministers to answer in Parliament for the problems in 
the ministries under their control. remedy the problems, and share their departments 
l b· 1 · ?Q? CU pa I 1ty.- - Because Parliament meets regularly and oppo ition members will take 
ministers to task over the failings in their departments though parliamentary question . 
the executive is not only responsible to the electorate on a tri-annual basis. Rather, they 
are responsible to the people's representatives, and hence the people themselves, daily. 203 
The duties imposed on Ministers by ministerial responsibility tie into the need to 
retain the support of Cabinet. If a minister is hurting the party's popularity. desire to 
maintain popularity to ensure re-election will pressure the minister to improve his or her 
performance, or risk having Caucus demand a resignation. While the force of ministerial 
l'J8 G Palmer Unbridled Po\\'er: An /111erpreu11io11 of Neir Zealand's Cons1in111on and Co1'e rnme111 (2 11d ed. 
Oxford University Press. Auckland , 1987) 17 . 
199 B Ackerman "The New Separauon of Po\1 ers" (:WOO) 113 Harv L Re\ 633, 658. 
200 B Ackerman, above. 658. 
201 B Ackerman. abo\e. 65 
202 G Palmer and M Palmer Bridled Pml'er ew Zealand Government Under MMP (Oxford Un1vers111 
Press. Auckland, 1997) 72. 
203 For a discussion of the contours of ministerial responsibility see M S R Palmer "M1nistenal 
Responsibility versus Chief Executive Accountability: Conflict or Complaint" (Analysing and 
Understanding Crucial Developments in Public Law, Wellington, 4 April 2001) 6 - 13; G Palmer and M 
Palmer Bridled Power New Zealand Covem111e111 Under MMP (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997) 
72 - 77. 
34 
responsibility is under pressure. 20.i it serves an important purpose of pressuring mini sters 
to maintain competence in their departments . 
However, while democracy is a vital check on government its ability to effectively 
restrain government should not be overstated. Most importantly, the restraints which 
democratic controls place upon government will generally only stop unpopular actions. 
Protecting liberty will not necessarily fall into this category. For example the 
retrospective increases in sentences discussed above205 would be unlikely to raise popular 
dissatisfaction such as to force Parli ament not to pass such legislation . Further, elections 
are a blunt tool , forcing electors to make a general assessment of a party' s 
performance. 206 A government may act in an unpopular way on one matter, but still 
retain sufficient popularity to return to power. This limits the effectiveness of elections 
as an in stitution of control. 
2. The Official Information Act. 
The purpose of the OIA is to increase the availability of information to people, to 
enable their more effective participation in making and administration of laws and 
poli c ies and promote accountability of government. 207 By making official information 
available to the public the OIA changed the position that had existed prior to 1982 where 
government information was off limits to the public. 208 
20
.i Mi stakes of Ministers depart111ents are 111ore often being dealt wi th by depart111ent 111embers. For 
examp le in defending the inadequate OtTi c1al In formation Ace disclosure regarding ··Corngace·· wh il e Miss 
Clarke was questioned in Parlia111ent: it was not che Prime Miniscer. but Mar"- Prebble himself. who 
defended hi s actions on nacional radio. lmerv1ew wi ch Professor Colin James (Sean Plun"-et. Morning 
Report , aci onal Radio. 3 September :2003): lnter,iew wich Dr Mark Prebble (Sean Plunket. Morning 
Report, National Radio, 29 Sepcember 2003). 
205 See Pan III A 2 Unconcrolled Lawmaking above. 
206 G Palmer Unbridled Power An lnterpretr11ion of Ne11• Zealand's Cons1i1u1ion and Covem111e111 (2"d edn. 
Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1987) 15 . 
207 Official Infor111ation Act 1982, s 4. 
208 Thi s had been the case under the Official Secrets Act 1951 , repealed by the Official Informati on Act 
1982, s 51: P A Joseph Cons1i1111ional and Acl111inistrati1•e Law in Nell' Zealand (2"ct ed. Butterwonhs. 
Wcll1ng1on , 2001) 148 - l-i9 . 
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Official information is defined broadly to include any information held by a 
department. 209 Although the OTA provides for circumstances where information should 
not be made availabie,2' 0 the basic principle of the OIA is that all official information 
should be made available unless there is good reason for it. 2 11 If a request is denied then. 
following a written complaint, the Ombudsmen may investigate the decision to refuse to 
release requested information. 212 The Ombudsman may then recommend that the 
information be disclosed, 213 which will become a public duty if the Governor-General in 
council does not direct otherwise within 21 days. 21.i 
The open access to information facilitated by the OIA allows people to enquire much 
further into the propriety of government decisions than they might otherwise be able to 
d 215 0. In the first instance citizens have a cheap and effective means of accessing 
government decisions affecting them . Second, the ability to obtain official information 
makes it easier to take formal actions against the state. In this way the OIA .. significantl y 
altered the balance between the citizen and the state. "2 16 
Additionally, the knowledge of government that its decisions can easily be open to 
public scrutiny alone fosters responsible government. This is now buttressed by 
opposition parties using the OIA to obtain documents to investigate and hold the 
government to account over its policies.217 While this was not contemplated as a purpose 
for enacting the OIA, it is consonant with the OIA ' s purpose of promoting responsible 
government. 21 8 
209 Official lnformation Act 1982, s 2. 
21 0 Official Information Act 1982, ss 6 and 9. 
211 Official Information Act 1982, s 5. 
2 12 Official Information Act 1982, s 28. 
2 13 Official Information Act 1982, s 30( 1) . 
214 Official Information Act 1982, s 32 . However, thi s power has never been used . 
2 15 P A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative La w in New 'Zealand (211d ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 
2001 ) 149. 
216 Fletcher Ti111b er Ltd, , Allomev-Ceneral 1198-1 ] I NZLR 290. 305 (CA ) McMullin J 
217 PA Joseph. above. 160. · 
2 18 PA Jo~eph. above, 160. 
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However. while beneficial, the effectiveness of the OJA in checking government is 
limited in that it only promotes open government. This is effective for exposing 
unpopular and illegal actions that can then be remedied by public pressure on the 
government or judicial review. The OIA does not directly limit the concentration of 
power in the hands of the Cabinet. rather it only provides an informal means to make it 
less likely government will act in an unpopular or improper way. Thus while useful, the 
OIA is best viewed as a supplementary check, tying into and reinforcing other checks 
such as judicial review and democratic accountability. 
3. The Ombudsmen. 
The pnmary purpose of the Ombudsman is to ensure that good standards of 
administration are observed. 219 Internationally. Ombudsmen have been an increasingl 1 
popular response to the enlarged administrative state, and the associated fear of 
individual citizens' rights being "accidentally crushed by the vast juggernaut of the 
government's administrative macl1ine."220 The purpose of the Ombudsman is to work 
alongside more traditional avenues dealing with claims that do not fit traditional 
administrative remedies, or would not ordinarily be brought because of the prohibitive 
f I. . . 721 cost o 1t1gat1on.-
Each Ombudsman may investigate any matter relating to administration affecting a 
person or body made by any of the bodies listed in the First Schedule to the Ombudsmen 
Act 1982.222 either following a complaint. or on his or her own volition?D Pursuant to 
wide grounds22.i the Ombudsman may recommend that the decision be rectified. 
219 JUSTICE .. All Souls Review of Administrative Committee Report " Ad111i11is1ra1il'e Justice ( 1988) 94 . 
220 DC Rowat .. An Ombudsman Scheme for Canada" (1962) Can. J. Econ. & Poli Sc. 5-+3. 543. 
221 A Sataynand "The Office of the Ombudsman in New Zealand" ( 1997) 6 Can t LR -+70. 471: BC 
Developmelll Corp. 1• Fried111a1111 ( 0111b11ds11w11) 11984 J 2 RCS 447, 460 (SCC); Case Number A6 710. 
Anand Satyanand, 1211, Compelldiwn of Casse Notes of the 0111b11dsme11 (Butterwonhs, Wellington, 200 l ), 
33; Case Number W36 l I 7, Anand Satyanand, ! l' Compendium of Casse Notes of the Ombudsmen 
(Butterworths, Wellington, 2000), 18. 
m Ombudsmen Act 1975, s 13( 1). This is a wide group of bodies including entities such as the Pesticides 
Board, the New Zealand Symphony Orchestra and the New Zealand Lotteries Commission as well as 
~overnment ministries. 
-
23 Ombudsmen Act 1975, s 13(3). 
224 Ombudsmen Act 1975, ss 22( l ) and 22(2). 
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cancelled, altered or varied. 225 Although the recommendations the Ombudsmen make on 
matters other than official information are non-binding, the vast majority of cases will see 
the Ombudsmen's recommendations followed, if not in the sort term then in the medium 
and longer terms. 226 
The Ombudsmen ' s cost effectiveness and their broad jurisdiction makes them a check 
227 on government that can go above and beyond formal redress through the courts. 
Ombudsmen are "an efficient procedure through which complaints may be investigated, 
bureaucratic enors and abuses brought to light and corrective action initiated."228 For 
example in 2000 the Ombudsmen stopped the Inland Revenue Department sending mail 
unnecessarily as a result of the inadaptability of their computer system. 229 
The Ombudsmen have also been involved in more substantive checking of 
government power. For example in 2001 an Ombudsman investigation led to a school 
reversing its decision to expel a pupil , and to change its procedures for expulsions.230 
This is indicative of the larger scale work the Ombudsmen have ca1Tied out helping set 
standards for schools to follow in expelling or suspending students .231 Therefore despite 
the existence of parallel judicial review remedies (as exist in the case of school 
expulsions) the Ombudsmen prove to be a cost effective solution. 
The Ombudsmen have had a "healthy effect on decision making in New Zealand 
)", 
government._.,_ However, there are limitations to the Ombudsmen's capacities. At 
present because Ombudsmen do not have coercive powers, they rely on their reputation 
225 Ombudsmen Act 1975, s 22(3). 
226 A Sataynand ·'The Office of the Ombudsman in New Zealand' ' ( 1997) 6 Cant LR 470. 479. 
227 A Sataynand, above, 471 . 
228 BC Develop111enr Corp ,, Friedmann ( 0111b11ds111an ) [ 1984 J '.2 SCR 447. 463 (SCC) Dickson J. 
229 Case Number W36 l I 7, Anand Sat yanand . / !'" Co111pendi11111 of Case Nores of rh e 0111/J11d.1111e11 
(Butterwonhs. Wellington, 2000), 18. 
23° Case umber A6557, Anand Satyanand, !?.'" Co111pe11diu111 oj Cwe Nores of rhe 0111b 11d, 111en 
(Butterworth s, Wellington, 200 I ), 49. 
231 G Palmer and M Palmer Bridled Po,ver Ne w Zealcllld CO\'emme111 Under MMP (Oxford Uni versit y 
Press , Auckland, 1997) 226. 
232 G Palmer and M Palmer, above, 227. 
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and fear of public criticism for compliance with their recommendations. 233 The need to 
maintain a high reputation means that the Ombudsmen are not in titutionally suited to do 
more than control bureaucracy, rather than limit the state's substantive power. For more 
substantial matters the courts are more institutionally suited for restraining government 
because of their coercive powers and established procedure. 234 
4. Judicial Interpretation as a Limitation on Parliamentary Sovereignty. 
While there is no judicial review of legislation in New Zealand235 the courts still act 
as a restraint on Parliament via their ability to interpret legislation. The courts· 
construction of legislation in a constitutionally appropriate fashion serves to restore some 
balance within our Constitution. 
For example in Reade v Smith 236 the Court followed an extremely narrow 
interpretation of two provisions of the Education Act 1914. one which would have 
allowed the Minister of Education an unfettered discretion, and another that would have 
given the Governor General in Council a power to make regulations inconsistent with the 
principal act. 237 Had the Court not read down the Education Act in this way, the effect 
would have been to transfer unchecked power to the executive, 238 and to allow the 
. . I . I . 239 executive to exercise egis ative power. 
233 G Palmer and M Palmer Bridled Power Ne11 · Zealand Co1•en11nen1 Under MMP (Oxford Un1ver\ Jt) 
Press, Auckland, 1997) 72 - 77. 
234 While the Ombudsmen Act does make provision for parties to be heard whom the Ombudsmen intend to 
make adverse comment against, in the context of the inquisitorial process of the Ombudsmen, this cannot 
substitute carefully established procedural safeguards developed by the courts; Ombudsmen Act 1975, s 
22(7). Of particular note among Ombudsmen procedure problems for dealing with more substantive 
matters are the un-reviewable nature of Ombudsmen recommendations (except as relating to the OIA) and 
the secrecy of the proceedings; Ombudsmen Act ss 25 and 21(2) respectively. 
235 Shall' 11 Commissioner of !nlcllld Revenue [ 1999] 3 NZLR 154 (CA). See also New Zealand Bill of 
Right~ Act, -1 which maintains the right of Parliament to legislate contrary to the fundamental rights and 
freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights . 
236 Reade 1• S111i1h J 1959] NZLR 996 (SC). 
237 Reade v Smith, above, 1002 and 1004 Turner J. While Reade v S111i1h is now an old case dealing'" 1th a 
statue which has now been substantially altered, the case is still of use as an example of the Court,· powers 
of interpretation. Moreover Reade v S111i1h retains considerable validity with respect to interpretation given 
the analogous approach followed in the Anis111inic 1· Foreign Compenswion Co111111ission [ 1969] 2 AC 14 7 
(HL) line of cases also discussed in thi section. 
238 Reade v Smith, above, 1002 Turner J. 
239 Reade v Smith , above, I00-1 Turner J. 
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As Turner J candidly noted the Court strove to give the act a restrictive interpretation 
to mitigate Parliament 's surrender or its powers .2"+0 Under the separation of powers this 
was an entirely proper approach for the Court to take. To do otherwise would allow the 
executive to act in a legislative fashion and unduly restrict the Court's supervisory 
jurisdiction. Hence Reade v Smith demonstrates a means , which within the confines or 
our Westminster system. allows some balance to remain between the branches of 
government by presenting resistance to the combined weight of Parliament and the 
executive. 
2
.j
1 C f Similarly Ill Bulk Gas Users Group v Attorney-General the ourt o Appeal 
adopted the Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission2.j2 approach to the 
construction of ouster clauses. 243 Under the Anisminic doctrine a tribunal of limited 
jurisdiction has no jurisdiction to make an error of law, hence the decision can always be 
reviewed if it contains an enor of law, notwithstanding an ouster clause purporting to 
exclude the general courts' review jurisdiction.2.j.j Again, this approach strives to protect 
the proper functions of the branches of government. 245 As such it strives to maintain 
balance in the constitution and is appropriate under the separation of powers. 
This approach to interpretation has been given added emphasis by the requirement of 
the Bill of Rights to interpret legi slation consistently with the Bill of Rights where uch 
an interpretation is possible. 2.j6 Under Moonen v Film and Literarure Board of Revie11 ·_'.r 
it is now clear that the Courts will give legislation as consistent an interpretation with the 
240 Reade 1• S111i1h [ 19591 NZLR 996. I 00-t (SC) Turner J. 
w Bulk Cos Users Croup 11 Allome_v-Cenera/ 11980] 2 ZLR 130 (CA). This reasoning has also been 
affirmed recently in Pe1ers 1• Dc11•iso11 2 NZLR 16-t (CA) 205 - 210 Tipping J. 
242 Anis111i11ic v Foreign Co111pe11satio11 Co111111issio11 [ 1969 J 2 AC 147 (HL) . 
243 Bulk Gas Users Croup v A11orney-Cenera/, above, 133 Cooke J. 
w O'Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237 (HL) 278 Lord Diplock. 
245 As Richardson P, Henry and Keith JJ said in Pe1ers v Davison, the constitutional role of the Court 1s to 
rule on questions of law; Pe1ers v Da vison 2 NZLR 164, 188 (CA) Richardson P, Henry and Keith JJ . 246 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, ss 4 and 6. 
241 Moonen v Film and Literwure Board of Revie11• [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA) . 
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Bill of Rights as is possible without going past a tenable interpretation of the conflicting 
legislation , or giving the right in question an unjustifiably large ambit.
2
-1
8 
Hence the courts are have put a substantial gloss on the supremacy of Parliament so 
far as Parliament attempts to violate the separation of powers, the rule of law and the 
protection of these concepts in judicial review. Moreover, in doing so the judiciary act to 
preserve the separation of powers by refusing to yield their proper jurisdiction to 
Parliament. While such vigorous exercise of judicial review in reading down legislation 
conflicts with notions of Parliamentary supremacy, from a separation of powers point of 
view, this is an essential check on the power of the legislature in a parliamentary system. 
As Hamilton advocated, the Courts should be the bulwarks of the Constitution against 
legislative encroachments. 2-19 Therefore, such liberal interpretations of Parliament' s 
words are a central and necessary check that is placed upon the legislature . Thi s is 
particularly so when the Courts cannot review legislation. If anything the Courts should 
be more aggressive in their reading down of legislation which conflicts with the 
· f ?50 separat10n o powers. -
5. Judicial Review of Executive Action. 
While the courts must follow the intent of Parliament, judicial review ensures that the 
executive acts within the authority that they have under law. 251 Even some prerogative 
· 252 powers of the Crown can now be subject to judicial review, although some powers 
m Moonen v Film and Lirerarure Board of Re1•ie11' [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 16 - 17 (CA) Tipping J. 
2
•
9 Hamilton Fecleral1sr 78 111 S F Mittell (edJ T/1e Feclemlis1 (Na tional Horne L1hrar) Foundatlllll . 
Washinton DC. 1961 ) 508. 
250 Lt seems that thi s emphasis may have been given added vigour fo ll o111 ng the adoption ot the ·principle 
of legalit y' stern mi ng from R 1· Secretary of //1e Sl(lle for the Home Depa mne,u exp Pi erson [ 19981 2 AC 
539 (HL): R 11 Secre/C/ry of the State for rhe Home Depa rr111 en1 exp Si111111s (2000] 2 AC 115 (HL): R ( Dair) 
v Secretary of rhe Srare for rhe Home Deparrmenr [2001] 2 WLR 1622 (HL), and endorsed in Drew 1· 
Artomey-Ceneral [2002] l NZLR 58 (CA). As the status of the doctrine is as yet still uncertain 1t 1s 
discussed below as a suggested modification of judicial review. 
251 Perers 1· Dm·ison 2 NZLR (1999116-1, 205- 210 especially 209 (CA) Tipping J. 
252 Council of Civil Service Unions 11 Minis1erfor The Ci1 1il Sen•ice [ 1985 I I AC 374, -1 I I (HL). The issue 
of whether the Crown or a Minister of the Crown can be compelled to act in a certain way still remains 
something of a vexed iss ue; see M v Home Office [ 1994] I AC 377 (HL). 
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remain non-justiciable. 253 The primary grounds of judicial review as described by Lord 
Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for The Civil Service25 .. are 
illegality, irTationality and procedural impropriety. 255 
After Peters v Davison256 the ground of illegality is the touchstone of judicial review 
in New Zealand. Under the doctrine of ultra vires the relevant body cannot act outside of 
its legal mandate. 25 7 Even if there is a broad discretion given the courts will not give an 
open ended license to the decision maker, rather the discretion will be read as limited to 
promoting the purpose of the policy and objects of the act. 258 The recent approach of the 
House of Lords259 and now the New Zealand Court of Appeal 260 has been to adopt an 
extended version of this doctrine whereby Parliament will be presumed to not legislate 
contrary to the rule of law unless there is clear evidence to the contrary. This includes 
presuming minimum standards of fairness both procedural and substantive. 261 
Under the head of irrationality or unreasonableness a decision may be impugned 
which "is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then 
the courts can interfere,"262 or an act which '·no sensible person could ever dream lay 
within the powers of the authority." 263 It seems that despite some calls for a liberalisation 
253 The classic example is national defence; see Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for The CtFil 
Service [1985] l AC 374,418 (HL) Lord Roskill: Curtis v Millistry of Defence (25 February 2002) Court of 
Appeal Wellington , CA 289/01, 13 Tipping J. 
254 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minist erfor The Civil Service, above. 
255 Council of Civil Service Ullions v Mi11is1 erfor The Civil Service, above, 410 Lord Diplock. 
256 Peters v Davison 2 NZLR [ 1999] 164 (CA). 
257 Peters v Daviso112 NZLR [1999] 164,205 - 210 (CA) Tipping J. 
258 Padfield v Minist er of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997, I 030 (HL) Lord Reid. 
259 R 1• Secretary of 1he Stale for the /-10111 e Department exp Pierson [ 1998] 2 AC 539 (HL): affirmed in R \' 
Secretary of th e State for th e /-10111e Depamnent exp Sim111s [2000] 2 AC 115 (HL): R (Daly) v Secrewrv of 
the Sta1efor 1he Home Depar1me1Z1 [2001] 2 WLR 1622 (HL). 
260 Drew v A11omey-General [2002] I NZLR 58, 70 (CA) Blanchard J. 
26 1 R v Secretary of the State for 1he Home Depart111 en1 exp Pierson, above, 591 (HL) Lord Steyn. 
262 Associcued ProFincial Pic111 re /-louses lid 1• Wednesbury Co rporation [ 19-18 J I KB 223, 229 ( HL) Lord 
Greene. 
263 Associated Pro1•incial Pic111re /-lou ses lid 1· Wednesb11ry Corporation , above, 229 Lorcl Greene. 
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of this standard,264 the "strict" Wednesbury standard remams the present law of New 
Zealand. 265 Hence judicial review, at least in theory, remains distinct from merits review. 
Under the head of procedural impropriety , courts ensure that decisions are made in 
the observance of natural justice and proper decision-making considerations. 266 
Therefore the decision maker is required to let sufficiently interested parties be heard, 267 
consider all relevant factors and exclude from consideration all irrelevant factors, 268 
provide the necessary information to affected parties before an adverse decision is 
d 269 d · f d · · 270 ma e, an give reasons · or a ec1s1on. 
While judicial review is a violation of a pure separation of powers, it is a necessary 
check on the power of the executive branch, and the excessive delegation of legislati ve 
functions .27 1 Furthermore, because the judiciary lack the power to directly enforce their 
judgrnents and are institutionally unsuited to govern, they will always be the weakest 
h f ?7? branc o government.- - Hence there is no need to fear increased judicial power 
overbalancing the other elements of the Constitution.273 
264 Waitakere City Council v Lovelock [1997] 2 NZLR 385, 401 (CA) Thomas J. See also the comments of 
Lord Cooke in R (Daly) v Secretary of the Staie for rhe Home Depan111e111 [2001J 2 WLR 1622, 1636 -
1637 (HL) Lord Cooke. 
265 
Wellington City Council v Woolworths New Zealand ( No 2) [ 1996] 2 NZLR 537, 552 (CA) Richardson 
P; Waiiakere Ci1y Council v Lovelock, above, 389 (CA) Richardson J. Note though that it has been argued 
that there is a sliding sca le of scrutiny depending upon the subject matter: M Taggart .. Reviev. : 
Administrative Law" [2003 J Z Law Rev 99. l 16 - l 17; P Joseph Cons11tu1ional and Ad111inis1ra!lve urn· 
in New Zealand {2 11d ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 2001) 837 - 839. 
266 Council of Civil Service Unions I' Mi11is1 er for The Civil Service [ 1985] I AC 37-L -+10 (HL) Lord 
Diplock . 
267 Lu111ber Specialties Lid v f-lodgso11 ['.20001 2 NZLR 3-+7. 365 - 366 & 370 (HC) 1-lammoncl J: Coal 
Producers ' Federa1ion of New Zealand ln corpora1ed v Canterbury Regional Co1111cil [ 1998] NZRMA 
257,271 - 274 (HC) Chisholm J. 
268 CREEDNZ v Covemor-Ce11eral [1981J I ZLR 172, 183 (CA) Cooke J . 
269 Dagcuwyasi v Minis1er of lmmigrmion 11980 I 2 NZLR 130, l 43 (CA) Cooke J 
270 Lewis v Wilson & f-lorron Lid [2000] 3 NZLR 5-+6, 567 (CA) Elias CJ. 
271 See the above discussion on the Anisminic 11 Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147 (HL) 
approach to ouster clauses, and the general approach to interpreting constitutionally odious legislation in 
Reade v S111i1h [ 19591 NZLR 996, I 004 (SC). For the most recent expansion in this area see R v Secretary 
of 1he S1a1e for the Home Depar1111el!l exp Pierson [ 1998] 2 AC 539 (HL) and the associated line of cases 
discussed below. 
272 Hamilton Federalisr 78 in S F Mittell (eel) The Federalis1 (National Home Library Foundation, 
Washinton D , 1961 ) 504; G Palmer and M Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand Covernmen1 Under 
MMP (Oxford University Press, Auckland, l 997) 242. 
273 Hamilton Federalis1 78 in S F Mittell (ed) The Federalist (National Home Library Foundation, 
Washinton DC, 1961 ) 504 It is submitted that thi s is preferable to the contra comments of Montesq u1eu: 
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Therefore, from the point of view of balance, one should not be concerned with the 
judiciary exercising increasing supervision over the other branches of government. This 
is subject to the caveat that supervision remains checking the constitutional propriety of 
governmental actions, instead of digressing into the proper domain of the other arms of 
government. 274 Thus the Courts are the guardians of the constitution, and as such should 
be exacting in checking other bodies, acting as the balance wheel of the constitution.275 
As Woodrow Wilson argued: 276 
So far as the individual is concerned, a consLiLuLional government is as good as its courts : no hener 
no worse . .. IL keeps its promises or does noL keep them 111 the courts. 
Alarmingly, the judiciary seems to be shying away from some of their constitutional 
duties of supervision rather than embracing them. This is particularly topical with respect 
to the protection in the Bill of Rights against unreasonable search and seizure. 277 The 
Court of Appeal has retreated from its appropriately exacting approach in R ,, Jefji-ies278 
to an overly submissive approach to executive abuse of power in R v Gardiner279 where 
the Court went so far as to state that the police did not need positive authority in law to 
justify their invasion of the privacy of a private home.280 
The non-requirement of positive legal authority in Gardiner conflicts with the Court' s 
role to ensure the executive remains within the bounds of the law, and balancing and 
Montesquieu, The Spirir of rhe Laws Book Xl, Ch 4, paras 13 - 14 in A M Cohler, B C Miller. and H S 
Stone (eds and trans) Ca111bridge Texts in rh e History of Political Thought (Cambridge Universit y Press, 
Cambridge) 158. 
274 The importance of a doctrine of due deference in thi s regard is discussed in Part VIC below. 
275 W Wilson Constitutional Go vernment in the Unit ed States (Columbia Uni versity Press. New York, 
1908) 142 . 
276 W Wilson, above, 17. 
277 New Zealand Bill of Rights AcL 1990, s 21. 
278 R v Jejji·ies J 1994] l NZLR 290 (CA ) 
279 R v Gardin er ( 1997) -I HRNZ 7 (CA) 11 Blanchard J. 
28° For a derailed criticism of R v Gardin er and other associated search and sei zure cases see Han Schwanz 
·'The Shon Happy Life and Tragic Death of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act" ( l 998J New Zealand 
Law Review 259, 293 - 303. The principal cases in this line of authority, which make for interesting 
reading are R v Gardin er (1997) 4 HRNZ 7 (CA); R v Grayson a11d Taylor [ I 997] l NZLR 399 (CA) ; R v 
Fraser (1997) 3 HRNZ 731 (CA) ; R v Bradley ( 1997) 4 HRNZ 153 (CA). 
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checking the other branches of government.281 While there are some policy areas where 
the Courts should for good reaso n be reluctant to enter into, but due deference does not 
extend to permitting conduct for which there is no justification. 282 
Furthermore, the position 111 Gardiner has the added fault of directly impairing 
individual liberty by allowing a video camera to focus on the inside of a private home 
using a zoom lens continuously for a period of six and a half months. 283 The purpose of 
the Bill of Rights was to give added protection to the individual against the powers of the 
?S.i ff" . . d . h . h 785 state,- a irmrng protecting an promot111g uman ng ts. - Therefore, the courts 
should use the Bill of Rights to vigorously protect human rights. This is consonant with 
the separation of powers , which also seeks to protect individual liberty.286 
6. Control of Delegated Legislation. 
Because of the vast and di verse nature of the modern state delegated legislation has to 
be accepted as necessary. 287 However. as the National government demonstrated in the 
1980s delegated legislation has signifi cant potential for abuse. 28b 
281 See the above discussion of ill ega lity and 11lrra 11ires in this part. 
282 The concept of due deference and how the co urts should approac h policy charged areas bearing 111 rn1nd 
their constitutional function is discussed in Pan VI B 4 Judicia l Review of Executi ve Action below. 283 R v Gardiner ( 1997) 4 HRNZ 7, 9 - l O (CA) Blanchard J. It rnay be the case however, that after the 
introduction of Shaheed balancing instead of the prima facie exc lusion rule that, while Grayson a11d Taylor 
remains good authority the courts wi ll be rnore stringent in what constitutes unreasonable search and 
seizure for the purposes of Bill of Ri ghts, section 21. See R 11 Shaheed [2002] 2 NZLR 377, 418 (CA) 
Blanchard J; R v Maihi (2002) 19 CRNZ 453 , 461 (CA) Tipping J. 
?84 - Rt Hon G Palmer ( 14 August 1990) 5 I O NZPD 3449 
285 New Zealand Bill of Ri ghts Act 1990. Long title. 
286 See Part II C Liberty The Dri ving Force of the Separati on of Powers and Part II E I Protecting L1beny 
above. For an alternati ve approach to Gardi11er see Halford v U11ired Ki11gdo111 ( 1997) 24 EHHR 523. [-+91 
- [5 l]; Kopp v Swit~erland ( 1998) 27 EHHR 9 1. 1621 - [ 64] and [75]: Valen::.uela Conrreras 1· Spa111 ( 1998) 
28 EHl-ffi. 483, [46]; A111a11n l' S1l'it::.erla11d (2000) 30 EHRR 8-+3 155] - 1561 In parti cul ar note the 
emphas is the Strasbourg Court places on the importance of the judge's role. For a di scussion of 1he 
importance of libert y and its place 111 the home see the 1udgrnen1 of Kennedy J for the maJOnt)' 111 John 
Geddes Lawrence a11d Tyrone Gamer, Petirioners 1· Texas (2003) US Lexis 50013 ( SSC). 287 M Chen NZLS Se111inar Delegated Legi, lmion , 95. 
288 See Part III A 2 Uncontrolled Lawmaking above with respec t to Henry VIII clauses and the Econorn1c 
Stabilisation A mendment Act 1982 . 
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The courts provide valuable control of regulations through judicial review.
289 
Like 
any act authorised by law, regulations may be reviewed for being ultra vires, which may 
now ex tend to prohibitin g the makin g of regulations so unreasonable that Parli ament 
would not have contemplated there being made. 29° Furthermore, under Drew v Attorney-
General, 291 empowering legislation will be construed in accordance with section 6 of the 
Bill of Rights, making a ll regul ations breaching the Bill of Ri ghts ultra vires except if 
there is specific legislative authorisation. 292 Similarly. under the Local Government Act 
2002 local government bodi es may not make bylaws that conflict with the Bill of 
Rights.
293 
Additionally, there is an obligation to consult groups mentioned in the 
empowering legisl ation or groups who are uniquel y or spec iall y effected by the 
I · 294 regu at1on. 
However, the cost of litigation , limitations of remedies available, problems of 
evidential burdens , and a narrow range of applicable grounds to challenge delegated 
legislation mean that judicial rev iew alone is an insufficient restrai nt on delegated 
1 . I . ?95 eg1s at1on. -
Possibly more important than judicial review for controlling regulations though has 
been the Regul ations Review Com mittee and the Regul ations Di sa llowance Act 1989. 296 
The Regul ations Review Comm ittee. a selec t committee of Parliament. examines all 
289 For a discussion of judicial review of regulations see M Chen and G Tanner Delegated Legislarion (Nev.. 
Zealand Law Society Seminar, Wellington , 2002) 21 - 37. 
290 Turners & Crowers Exporrs Ltd v Moyle ( 15 December 1988) High Court Wellington CP 720/88. 49 
McGechan J. There is debate as to whether unreasonableness exists as a separate ground of review of 
regulati ons in it s own right; see G Palmer .. Deficiencies in New Zealand Delegated Legis lation" ( 1999) 29 
VUWLR l , 13- 17. 
291 Drew v A{{or11ey-Ce11eral [2002J l NZLR 58 (CA) . 
292 Drew v Attorney-Ce11eral , above, 73B lancharcl J 
293 Local Government Act 2002, Section 155(3). However, given the approach of Drew v Atrom ey-
Ceneral, above to Bill of Ri ghts Section 6 and bylaws section 155(3) may not have changed anything. 
29
.i Fowler & Rodrique Ltd v Aflomey -Cenernl [ 1987] 2 NZLR 56, 78 (CA) Casey J; Turners & Crowers 
Exports Ltd v Moyle (15 December 1988) High Court Wellington CP 720/88, 61 - 62 McGechan J. See M 
Chen and G Tanner Delegc11 ed Legislation (New Zealand Law Society Seminar, Wellington, 2002), 23 -
25 . 
295 M Chen and G Tanner Delega1ed Legisla11011 (New Zealand Law Society Semi nar, Wellington , 2002) 
6 1. 
296 P A Joseph Constitutional and Ad111i11is1rwi1•e Law in New Zealand (2 11d ed, Butterworths , Wellington. 
2001) 247. 
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regulations , and may consider any matter relating to regulations.
297 
The purpose of the 
Regulations Review Committee ' s examination is to determine whether, under wide 
d 298 h I . h Id b b h h . f h H 299 groun s, t e regu at1on s ou e roug t to t e attention o t e ouse. The 
government must then respond within 90 days to the recommendations of the 
committee. 300 
The Regulations Review Committee also works in conjunction with the Regulations 
(Disallowance) Act 1989. 30 1 Under the Regulations (Disallowance) Act all regulations 
must be placed before the House .302 The House may then disallow the regulation. 303 
Furthermore, if a member of the Regulations Review Committee makes a motion of 
disallowance, the regulation will be deemed disallowed if the motion is not di sposed of in 
21 sitting days. 30-+ Thi s is particularl y important because the Government must act to 
prevent the regulations from being disallowed. 305 
Therefore the Regulations (Disallowance) Act is a powerful statute, 306 which 
although not often used itself, 307 has helped the Regulations Review Committee enjoy 
con siderable success,308 with its recommendations being adopted approximately 84 per 
cent of the time.
309 
Such Parliamentary oversight does much to reconcile delegated 
legislation with Parliament ' s role as the legislature. While Parliament's role as the 
297 Stallding Orders of the House of Represel!tati ves (1999) Standing Order 381 ; M Chen and G Tanner 
Delegated Legislatioll (New Zealand Law Society Seminar, Wellington , 2002) 65 . 
298 The grounds are set out in S1a11di11g Orders of 1he House of Represewcuives ( 1999) Standing Order 382. 
For a summary of the jurisprudence suITounding the nine standing order grounds see R Malone Regulatiolls 
Review Co111mittee Digest (New Zealand Centre for Public Law. Wellington, 2003) 18 - 55 . 
299 M Chen and G Tanner Delega1ed Legislario11 ( ew Zealand Law Soc iety Seminar. Wellington. 2002) 
67. 
300 Sralldillg Orders oft he House of Represe111arives ( 1999) Standing Order 248( I ). 
30 1 M Chen and G Tanner Deleg a1ed Leg islation (New Zealand Law Society Seminar, Wellington, 2002) 
68. 
302 Regulations (Disallowance) Act s 4. 
303 Regulations (Di sallowance) Act s 5(1 ). 
3o.i Regulations (Disallowance) Act s 6(1 ). 
305 R Mal one Regulario11s Review Co111111inee Digesr (New Zealand Centre for Public Law , Wellington, 
2003) 11. 
306 G Palmer "Defi ciencies in New Zealand Delegated Legi slation" (1999) 29 VUWLR 1, 9. 
im G Palmer "Defici enci es in Ne1,1 Zealand Delegated Legislation" ( 1999) 29 VUWLR l , 10. 
308 R Malone Reg ulations Revie11' Com111inee Diges1 (New Zealand Centre for Public Law , Wellington, 
2003) 11. 
309 M Chen and G Tanner Delegmed Leg islation (New Zealand Law Society Seminar, Wellington , 2002) 
70. 
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legislature is reinforced, specialist bodies are still allowed to substantively make law. and 
Parliament and the courts (by way of judicial review) ensure the constitutional propriety 
of the law . 
While the Regulations Review Committee has been a success, it can be improved 
further. 3 10 Suggestions for reform by increasing the autonomy of Parliamentary bodies 
scrutinising regulations are discussed below. 311 
C. Concluding Remarks. 
Notwithstanding the valuable checks within our Constitution. there are insuffici en t 
safeguards against the arbitrary use and abuse of governmental power. This is primarily 
because of the fusion between the executive and legislative branches, and the lack of any 
proper restraint on the legislature. Together these factors do not permit gen uine balance 
between the branches of the New Zealand constitution. 
To have such power as thi s residing in the executive. even if it is not as abused 
means, that as a matter of principle. ew Zealand's constitution is unbalanced. The fact 
that the opportunities for abuse have not been exploited in the way former governments 
have done only suggests the system can, to an extent, work in spite of itself. The basic 
problem remains - the Constitution lacks sufficiently robust safeguards to abuse. 
The constitutional checks outside of the three principal branches of the Constitution 
are of undoubted benefit. However. they remain peripheral checks on the system. not 
relating directly to the central problem; the excessive fusion and consolidation of 
insufficiently restrained power in the executive and legislative branches. As M J C Vile 
concluded his analysis of the Westminster constitution: 312 
·110 The argument has been put srronger by one commentator \.\,ho has suggested that the leg1slat1ve hranch ·, 
deterrents aga111st arbirrary or inappropriate regulations are still insufficienr; G Palmer "Defic1enc1es 111 
New Zealand Delegated Legislation" ( 1999) 29 VUWLR 1, 35. 31 1 See Pan IV A 3 A Second House of Parliament below. 
312 M JC Vile Co11stit11tio11a/is111 and the Separation of Powers (C larendon Press, Oxford, 1967) 238. 
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The 'separation of powers' remains, therefore, a central problem .... If our system is to remain 
essentially a system of government by ' law ' then some form of control must be exercised over the 
agents of government. If we abandon thi s philosophy of law how do we prevent mere expediency 
from degenerating into arbitrary government') . . . The fragmentation of consti tuti onal thought in 
Britain , and the rejection, for good reasons, of older political theories, without their being rep laced 
by any comprehensive view of the structure of our system of governmen t and the val ues 1t 1s 
intended to safeguard , lea ves us to drift before whatever wi nd of expediency may blow. 
The separation of powers should not be abandoned. Rather our constitution 
should be reformed to give effect to the doctrine to guard against autocratic use of state 
power. The proposed changes in th e next part suggest ways of reconfigurin g the main 
bodies of the Constitution in a manner that will give better protection to liberty. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS TO REMEDY BREACHES OF THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS. 
A. Separating the Executive and Legislative Branches. 
This section considers three options for separating the executive and legi s lati ve 
branches , to remedy problems in th e Constitution outlined above.
31 3 The first model 
constitutional a1i-angement considered is a Presidential sys tem . This is considered to 
illustrate the problems of a stri c t separation of powers, demonstrating why such a system 
should not be adopted in New Zealand. 3 14 
The remaining two options considered are intended as benefic ial reforms for ew 
Zealand. Both options are based around the separation of powers within a parliamentary 
313 Because of space constraints this paper will not consider what degree of Separation of powers is suited 
to ew Zealand 's poliucal economy. Rather the analysis is focused on reforms by which a better 
separation of powers may be achieved in ew Zealand . Fu rther. only three options will be specificall) 
considered. There are of course an infinite number of other potential systems . For example the S\,\ 1ss 
cons titution has two eq uall y powerful houses of Parliament, which together elect a seven member Federal 
Council (the executi ve) whi ch cannot be removed from office during its four-year term; B Ackerman ··The 
New Separation of Powers" (2000) 11 3 1--larv L Re\ 633. 678. 
31
-1 For a complete analysis and comparati ve critique of the Un ited States/French separation of powers see B 
Ackerman, above. 
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system. Of the second and third set of reforms, the third option, based around the 
addition of an upper house of Parliament is preferable.315 
1. A Presidential System. 
Under this system the President would control the executive government,316 
Parliament would be the legislature, 317 and the courts would be separate from both.318 
The President would be elected separately to Parliament. Separate voting would be 
required for the President and for Parliament.31 9 Therefore. the President would receive a 
f P I. 310 . democratic mandate that is quite independent o ar 1ament, - encouraging a stron g 
executive that is distinct from Parliament in both personnel and in mandate.32 1 As such 
the President would not need to maintain the confidence of Parliament. 322 However, the 
legislators will also have democratic legitimacy, giving them a standing on which to 
challenge the authority of the President. 323 
While additional checks can be added such as judicial review of legislation32.i and a 
presidential veto of legislation 325 can be added, these cannot remedy the fundamental 
flaws of the system and are not directl y considered. While presidential systems can 
315 See Part IV CA Second House of Parliament below. 
316 As in for example the US Constitution, Art II. 
317 As in the US Constitution, Art I. Thi s can be supplemented with a pres identi al veto. However. it 1s 
submitted that the addition of a veto is unnecessary to consider because as 1s di scussed belo\,\. pres1denual 
systems are unsuitable for New Zealand . 
318 As in the US Constitution. Art Ill . This paper does not enter into the debate as to whether the Pn vy 
Council should be aboli shed. The onl y iss ue considered with respect to the courts is the appropriate degree 
of separation that they should have from the other branches of government. Thi s can be ac hieved under 
either a New Zealand Supreme Co urt or under the Pri vy Council. 
319 J J Linz "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference')" in J J Linz and A 
Valenzuela (eds) Th e Failure of Presidenrial Democm cy (J ohns Hopkins Uni versit y Press. Baltimore. 
1994) 6. 
320 J J Linz ·'The Perils of Presidentiali sm" in A Lijpart (ed) Parlicunenrary Ve rsus Pres1dew wl 
Co vemmenr (Oxford Uni versity Press. Oxford , 1992) 11 8, 119. 
321 J J Linz "Pres idential or Parli amemary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference·)" in J J Linz and A 
Valenwel a (eels) Th e Failure of Presidenr ial Democracy (Johns Hopkins Uni versity Press. Baltimore. 
1994) 3, 6. 
322 J J Linz, above, 6. 
323 J J Linz '·The Peril s of Presidentiali sm·· in A Lijpart (ed) Parliamentary Versus Presidential 
Covem111e11r (Oxford Uni versity Press, Oxford , 1992) 11 8, 120. 
324 Such as under Marbury v Madison ( 1803 ) I Cranch 5. 
325 For exampl e US Constitution, An I 7. 
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work. as arguably has happened in the USA. 326 presidential systems are inst1tutionally 
flawed. 327 As such one should not be adopted in New Zealand. 
The first maJor set of defects of a presidential system flow from the necessity of 
. . 1 . I I . I I 328 w1nrnng mu tip e e ecuons to get p enary contra over government. In a classical 
Westminster system a party needs to win only one election. 329 However, in a presidential 
system, gaining control over the three principle branches of government requires winning 
successive elections across the executive and legislative branch. 330 This will rarely 
happen. For example in the USA, the last time there was full authority in the hands of 
one party was in the 1960's (with the Democrats).331 A similar situation is probably close 
to being in place today, particularly if Sandra O'Connor is replaced with a conservative 
Republican on the Supreme Court. 332 
Therefore the most common result is that governmental control will be distributed 
among more than one party. 333 The result is that conflict can and will occur between the 
branches, both of whom have a legitimate mandate to take part in government. 33 -1 1t is 
326 B Ackerman ·The ew Separa11on of Powers·· (2000) I 13 Harv L Rev 633, 6-+2. 
327 The following will be a summary of the inherent flaws in Presidential systems. For a more detailed 
analysis see B Ackerman "The New Separation of Powers '· (2000) l 13 Harv L Rev 633; J J Linz 
·'Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference?" in J J Linz and A Valenzuela 
(eds) The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1994) 3; G 
Sartori " Neither Presidentialism nor Parliamentarism in J J Linz and A Valenzuela (eds) The Failure of 
Presidential Democracy (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1994) 106; J J Linz ''The Perils of 
Presidentialism" in A Lijparr (eel) Parliamewary Versus Presiden1ial Govenzmem (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford , 1992) 118; J J Linz "The Virtues of Parliamentarianism" in A Lijpart (ed) Parliamentary 
Versus Presidewia/ Goven1111e111 (Oxford University Press , Oxford, 1992) 212; F W Riggs 
"Presidentialism: A Problematic Regime Type" in A Lijpart (ed) Parlia111e11tary Versus Preside,uia/ 
Govenz111e111 (Oxford University Press. Oxford. 1992) 217 A Lijphan Pauem s of Democracy: Govern111e111 
Forms and Perfor111a11ce i11 Thiny-Six Cou111ries (Yale University Press. New Haven. 1999). 328 B Ackerman '·The New Separation of Powers·· (2000) 113 Harv L Rev 633, 643. 329 B Ackerman, above, 643. 
330 B Ackerman , above, 643 - 644. This assumes that the judiciary will be appointed by the executive and 
legislative branches on a partisan basis, which has been the case in the USA. 331 B Ackerman, above, 65 I 
332 It would seem that this would depend on President Bush being re-e lected and Republicans retaining their 
majoritie in Congre , as the controversy surrounding a Supreme Court appointment would make n 
unlikely for President Bush to appoint an ex treme conservative until after he is re-elected . 
m B Ackerman, above, 645 and 65 I 
rn J J Linz ··The Perils of Pres1clentialism'" in A L1jpan (eel) Parlic1111e111ary Versw Preside,wal 
GO\'ern111e111 (Oxford University Press. Oxford. 1992) 11 8, 120. 
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almost certain that this conflict will divide and limit the power of government. 335 
Regardless of whether impasse occurs or not, impasse being the usual state of affairs 
naturally leads to an unsatisfactory situation. 
If one party does acquire such '·full-control" of all three branches ubstantial 
bi · 336 pro ems anse. Partie in separation of powers systems are well aware that the 
opportunity to operate in full authority mode will seldom arise. Therefore, hav111g won 
control over all of government the party will be inclined to implement as many reforms 
as possible as fast as possible, 337 knowing that the "constitutional clock" is ticking. 338 
This is aggravated by the inevitable desire of the party with full authority to entrench 
their ideas. knowing that it will be extremely hard for the opposition to win the 
successive elections necessary to gain sufficient control to repeal the laws passed. 339 
The result is that full control encourages the passage of ideologically driven 
legislation. 3-io Hence, ironically while the separation of powers is designed to produce 
balanced and moderate government, if one party acquires full authority there is a natural 
inclination towards immoderate government. 
In contrast, parliamentary systems. give less inclination to take advantage or a 
position of domination. First, Cabinet is always exposed to a revolt by the backbench 
members if the party 's popularity drops too much. 3-i 1 Presidents however, have a fixed 
term in office. 342 Hence, there is not the possibility of losing the confidence of 
335 B Ackerman 'The New Separation of Powers" (2000) 113 Harv L Rev 633, 645 - 648. 
336 B Ackerman, above, 650 - 651. 
337 B Ackerman, above, 650 - 653. 
338 B Ackerman, above, 651. 
339 B Ackerman. above, 652 . 
3
"
0 B Ackerman. above. 651 . 
3
" 
1 B Ackerman , abo\ e, 65 
.m J J Linz ··Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Doe!> it Make a Difference ·)·· 111 J J L1nL and A 
Valenzuela (ed~ ) Th e Failure of Pres1deww/ Democracy (John!> Hor"1n !> U111 ver !> ll ) Pre!>!> . Balumure. 
1994) 3, 6 
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Parliament that there is in a parliamentary sys tem, giving the President far more less 
reason to be responsive to public criticism. 343 
Second, in parliamentary systems the government has far less incentive to entrench 
their policies. Given their knowledge that another party could have the power to change 
their policies after the next general election, it is in the Government 's interest to make the 
policies work so that they will be maintained. 3-1-1 
While the most common situation in a presidential sys tem is impasse, 3-1 5 this does not 
necessarily improve the situation. Impasse will generaJly lead to one of three 
alternatives. The first is constitutional breakdown where nothin g is done, and one branch 
reacts by assuming so much constitutional power as to destroy the separation of 
powers. 3-1 6 At the other extreme there is the poss ibility that government will function 
. bi d . . ) -l? amJca y esp1te impasse. Alternatively, in a middle ground the branches of 
government will quan-el continually each trying to further their own partisan goals. 34 
None of the options is particularly attractive. Even the best alternative during 
impasse. where there is some genuine co-operation seems certain to lead to ··pork-ba1Tel-
politics" where favo urs must be traded to secure important government policies. 
Moreover, given the strong party culture in New Zealand, substantial acrimony between 
the President and Parliament would be expected if they were divided along party lines. 3-19 
343 J J Linz "The Perils of Presidentialism·· 111 A Lijpart (ed) Par/ia111entar\' Versus Pres1dewwl 
Covemmew (Oxford University Press. Oxford. 1992) 11 8, 11 9. 
}.j.j B Ackerman , above, 65 1. 
345 B Ackerman , above, 645. 
346 B Ackerman, above, 6..J.5. J J Linz "Presidential or Parl iamentary Democracy Does ll Make a 
Difference'?" in J J Linz and A Valenzuela (eds) The Failure of Preside111ial De111 ocrac\' (Johns Hopk ins 
Uni versity Press, Baltimore, 1994) 3. This seems to have been a cause of the breakdown of democraC) 111 
South American Pres idential sys tems; See J J Linz "Presiden ti al or Parliamentary Democracy: Does 11 
M ake a Difference?" in J J Linz and A Valenzuela (eds) The Failure of Presidellfial Democracy (Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1994) 3. 
347 B Ackerman, above, 645. 
348 B Ackerman, above, 6-+7. 
349 For a di scuss ion of the strength of the Part y sys tem in New Zealand see G Palmer New 'Zealand 's 
Co1!Slit111ion in Crisis (John M clndoe, Dunedin , 1992) 129 - 149. Compare chi to the weak, fractured and 
clientali siic nature of parties in Presidential sys tems; J J Linz "Presidential or Parli amentary Democracy: 
Does it Make a Difference')" in J J Linz and A Valenzuela (eds) Th e Failure of Presidenrial Democracy 
(Johns Hopk111 s Uni versity Press, Baltimore, 199..J.) 3, 42 . 
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One would expect a situation at leas t as acrimonious as when Bill Clinton had to deal 
. h R bi . I . I 350 wit a epu 1can eg1s ature. 
Furthermore, even where there is not full authority, there is a tendency for the 
President to make a substantial number of political appointments in the executive to 
ensure that the his or her policies are implemented.351 This hinders the effective 
functioning of the public service in that public servants will have limited time to become 
d h . . b 352 h h f 353 d ·11 I . . l d . a ept at t eir JO s, ave a s art term ocus, an w1 a so prevent 1mpartia a vice 
being given. 354 New Zealand presently has a tradition of limited political appointments in 
the public service. 355 This should not be disturbed. 
While a President may not have the same power over legislation as a Prime Mini ster 
who happens to have a strong hold on Cabinet does, there is st ill an unhea lth y 
concentration of power in one person. The first problem is the "cult of personality" that 
the President 's personal mandate tends to bring.356 This caITies the additional problem of 
people inexperienced in government being able to run for high office. 357 
Furthermore, the President will be the dominant figure on the political scene, being a 
primus rather than a primus inter pares. 358 Unlike parliamentary government, the loosing 
candidate will not have a formal role in the opposition, removing the opportunity for the 
35° For former President Clinton this created substanti al problems passing health care leg islation, and at one 
stage federal government had to close for 6 clays while the President and Congress quarre lled over the 
budget; M J Sodaro Comparati ve Politics: A Global lwroducFion (McGraw Hill, New York, 2001) 122. 351 B Ackerman, above, 703. 
352 B Ackerman, above, 706 - 708. 
353 B Ackerman, above, 707 - 708. 
354 G Scott Public Manage111e11F in New Zealand: LeHons and Challenges ( ew Zealand Bus111ess 
Roundtable, Wellington, 200 1) 79. 
355 G Scott, above, 76 - 8 1. 
356 B Ackerman, above. 657; D Verney .. Parliamentary Government and Presidential Governmen t" 111 A 
Lijphan (eel) Parlia111e/llc11 y Versus Presidennal Covem111e11F (Oxford University Press. Oxford. 1992). 357 J J Linz '·Pres identi al or Parli amentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference·r· 111 J J Linz and A 
Valenzuela (eds) The Failure of Preside/Ilia/ De111ocracy (Johns Hopkins Universi ty Press. Balumore. 
1994) 66 - 67. For a recent examp les consider the bid of Actor Arnold Schwarzenegger for Governor of 
Cali fo rni a, who seems unab le to point to any other political experience than promoting .. Proposition 49'" 
(which related to after schoo l programs for child ren): Arnold for Governor ht tp://\.\ww.arnoldgovernor.net 
(last visited l..J. September 2003) . 
358 G Sartori ·· Neither Presiclentialism nor Parliamentarism in J J Linz and A Va lenzuela (eds) The Failure 
of Presidential De111ocracy (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1994) 106, 110. 
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359 public to evaluate how the opposition would perform if they were in government. 
Instead the opposition is largely forgotten. 360 
Additionally, ministerial responsibility is largely incompatible with Presidential 
systems, owing to a lack of a rival shadow executive and the non-requirement of 
maintaining the confidence of Parliament. While the it is a small step to force members 
of the executive to report before Parliament to justify their actions, ministerial 
responsibility will be weaker where ministers are not members of Parliament. Because 
the executive would be appointed separately of the parliamentary elections they would 
have their own independent mandate, and are thus not responsible to Parliament. and do 
not need to maintain the support of Caucus. 361 Therefore, presidential systems cannot 
allow Parliament to exert the same pressure on ministers to perform, and will generally 
not preserve integrity in the public service as well as parliamentary systems. 362 
For example. President Bush has yet to be examined by the legislature regarding the 
accuracy of his claims that Iraq was seeking to acquire nuclear weapons from 1ger. 
while Tony Blair has been rigorously examined by Parliament. 363 This also ties back into 
the inclination of MPs within a party to call for the resignation of Minister who hurt the 
party popularity. In a parliamentary sys tem there is genuine pressure for Ministers to 
perform when questioned by Parliament. 
Furthermore, Presidential systems raise problems of democratic legitimacy by the 
appointment of unelected people to Cabinet, whose identities are often not known until 
after the election. For example John Ashcroft lost his Senate seat to a candidate who had 
died a month before the election only to be given the post of Attorney-General by George 
359 J J Linz ·'Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference'J" in J J Linz and A 
Valenzuela (eels) The Failure of Preside11rial Democracy (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 
1994) 3, 67. 
360 J J Linz, above, 14. 
361 J J Linz, above, 6 
362 Compare to the discussion of how ministerial responsi bility works in a parliamentary sys tem discussed 
in Part III B l Cabinet Government above. 
363 D E Sanger and Wa1Ten Hoge '·After the War; War's Rationale: Bush facapes Fury that Batters Blair·· 
(26 June 26 2003) New York Ti111es (Late Ecl it1 011J Section A , Page 14 , olumn 4. 
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Bush Jr.36-i This is a substantial affront to democratic legitimacy, and deprives the people 
of knowing precisely what they are voting for when they cast their vote.365 
Finally, a presidential system will perform even more poorly if Parliament is elected 
by PR. 366 First, a Parliament fragmented into multiple parties, which PR is disposed to 
produce. will tend to allow a Pres ident dominate, destroying the balance the system 
should promote. 367 Second . inclin ati ons to vote al ong part y lines in a PR Parliament 
make dealings between President and Parli ament to prevent impasse more diffi cult than if 
the legislators had individual FPP mandates.368 This would make a Presidenti al sys tem 
even more unworkable . 
Hence. a Pres identi al sys tem should not be adopted. Instead. the separation of powers 
is max imi sed within the cu1Tent parli amentary system of govemment. 369 
2. A Parliamentary System 1vith a Separate Executive Branch. 
Under this system Cabinet would be separated from Parliament. 370 There would be a 
single, triennial MMP election . Whil e Mini sters would still stand for Parli ament. 371 upon 
364 E A Hutchi son ··Ashcroft Poses a M ortal Threa1 to Civil Ri ghts·· (28 December 2000) 5011 Frn11c1.1w 
Chronicle San Francisco. 
365 There is a process of confirmation in the Senate (US Const i tution art II sec 2) . however thi s is onl y 
useful if a different party than the Pres ident 's contro ls the Senate. and even then there is potential for 
constitutional cri sis if the ad vice and consent powers are overu sed. While there is potential for analogous 
situations to ari se under MMP. for example the election of M ax Bradford via the party li st after he los t his 
electorate seat in 1996, party lists are known in advance letting people know who they are voting for. 366 B Ac kerman ·The New Separati on of Powers" (2000) 11 3 Harv L Rev 633. 656. 
167 B Ackerman, above. 656. 
168 B Aderman. above. 665. 
169 What 1s ad voca ted in the nex t two sections is effecti ve ly a form of constrained parli amentan an1 sm. 
building principall y on the ideas of Professor Bruce Ackerman in B Ackerman, above. 
370 This sys tem is built upon the suggestions proposed in G Palmer New Zealand's Cons1itutio11 in Crisis 
(John Mclndoe, Dunedin, 1992) 17 1 - 174; G Palmer (6 September 1990) 510 NZPD 4396; J Boston The 
Future of Cabinet Government in New Zea land: The implications of MMP fo r the Formation Organi::.ation 
Cllld Opercuions of Cabinet (GSBGM Publications, Wellington, 1994) 14 - 15 ; and J Bos ton and N Roberts 
"Bringing in the Outsiders" (6 M arch 1994) The Dominion Wellington 6. 37 1 This is unli ke the sys tem proposed by Bos ton and Roberts. See J Boston and Roberts in J Boston The 
F11 111re of Cabinet Govem111 e11 1 in Ne11 · Zeala nd: The implicario11s of MMP fo r 1he Fornllll ion Organi::.a 11 011 
and Opera/ions of Cabi11 e1 (GS BGM Pu blicauons. Wellington, 1994) 1-l - 15: and J Boston and Roberts 
··Bringing in the Outsiders" (6 M arch 199-l ) The Dominion Well ington 6. 
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accepting a place in Cabinet, Ministers would have to resign from Parliament. 372 Thi s 
would create a separation of personnel between the executive and the legislative branches 
that does not exist at the present, 373 while keeping a parliamentary system. 
If the member leaving Parliament for Cabinet were a list MP then the vacant seats 
would be filled by MPs from the party list. 37~ If the Cabinet member elect is a teJTitoria] 
member. then a by-election could be held. 375 However, the system would work much 
better if potential members of cabinet were on the party lists , primarily because it is 
undesirable to have a series of by-elections following the general election. 
Boston's and Roberts' concern of finding competent ministers can easily be served by 
including such people on the party li sts. 376 This strikes a balance between allowing 
people with specialist skills to be elected and ensuring democratic legitimacy by lettin g 
voters know prior to the election whom the ministers are likely to be. 
The principal benefit of the system would be that ministers would be separate from 
Parliament and would thus loose some of their control over it. As Sir Geoffrey Palmer 
said in his valedictory address to Parliament: 377 
[Ministers] should not be part of this place. If they are a part of this place, assuredly, they will 
con tinue to dominate it, and they will find means to continue their domination of it. 
The real difference in this system would be an increased fear of a backbench revolt by 
Cabinet, caused by the diluted con trol Cabinet would have over MPs . While it i naYve to 
suggest Cabinet, collective respon ibility, Caucus and party discipline would 
disappear, 378 the manner in which Caucus would function would change dramatically. At 
372 G Palmer Ne1v Zealand's Co11Sfi/[/Tion in Crisis (John Mcindoe, Dunedin , 1992) 173. 
373 G Palmer, above, 173. 
374 G Palmer. above, 173. 
375 G Palmer, above, 173. 
376 For examp le how ational included Donald Brash on the pany list for the 2002 general election . 
377 G Palmer (6 September 1990) 510 NZPD 4396; repeated in G Palmer, above, 173 . 
. m J Boston The Fwure of CabineT Go1 ·em111e111 in Nell' Zealand: The i111plica1ions of MMP for The 
Fonnmion Organi::.a1io11 and Opera/ions of Cabinet (GSBGM Publications, Wellington, 1994) 13. 
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present Cabinet consists of 20 members, 379 who will generally make up somewhere 
between a half to a third of Caucus. all of whom are the senior members of the party. and 
will, by dint of collective responsibility. speak with one voice in Caucus. This ensures 
that Cabinet has an overpowering influence in Caucus. 
In contrast, under the system suggested here, Cabinet would have far Jess numerical 
control over Caucus. because there would be an extra MP in Caucus for every Cabinet 
member. It would be expected that a party in ew Zealand could not govern without 
having 40 seats in Parliament (one third of the 120 seats). Therefore, even within a 
government with the smallest workable margin, and therefore the smallest party size, 
Cabinet would probably only account for a minority (one third) of Caucus. 380 
MPs' primary concern is re-election. 381 This drives one of the central benefits of the 
Parliamentary system, namely that MPs will be inclined to dispense with failing ministers 
and other members of the Party who are hurting party popularity. 382 In New Zealand 
though, the control of MPs over Cabinet has been limited by the small s ize of the 
Parliament, and the large percentage of Caucus controlled by the Cabinet. Under the 
system suggested here, Cabinet would have diluted control. Therefore the interests and 
desires of the executive would have a diminished influence on Caucus in comparison to 
the interests of MPs. Hence control over the party would be spread wider. lessening the 
power of Cabinet to control it, which in turn would reduce executive dominance over 
Parliament. 
The increased power of MPs vis-a-vis Cabinet could also serve to increase the 
potency of ministerial responsibility. As discussed above, Cabinets in parliamentary 
systems do not have an automatic tenure. 383 Rather their existence depends on 
maintaining the confidence of Parliament. which in turn depends on maintaining 
379 J Boston The F111ure of Cabinel Co1 •enu11e111 in Ne11· Zealand: The i111plica1io11; of MM P for 1he 
Fomwtion Organizwion and Opera11011; of Cabinet (GSBGM Publications, Well1ngton. 199~ ) 
380 Note though that this could vary depending on the ex istence and ma1'eup of the coal 1uon (1f there wa~ 
one). 
38 1 B Ackerman ·'The New Separation of Powers" (2000) 113 Harv L Rev 633, 658. 
382 B Ackerman, above, 658; see also the discussion in Part III A l Cabinet Government above. 
383 See Pan III A l Cabinet Government above. 
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popularity. Because MPs would have greater control within the party, they would be less 
likely to have to suffer losses in popularity for not disciplining a minister who had failed 
and caused the party to lose popularity. As ministers would still have to answer questions 
in Parliament, they would still be subjected to public criticism. which would create the 
necessary pressure on MPs to insist that ministers ensure their portfolios are managed 
competent! y. 
Additionally. there are valuable collateral benefits not directly related to the 
separation of powers that this system would bring. At present, ministers have to work in 
their electorates. perform general MP duties. and manage executive portfolios: an 
unmanageable workload. 38.i Under this system ministers would be free of electorate work 
and some of the burdens of Parliament. Furthermore, there would be incentive for 
capable people to seek public office who did not want to have to concern themselves with 
electorate work. 385 These are significant improvements on the present system.386 
However, once matters come out of Caucus and are introduced into Parliament, MPs 
would still be strongly inclined to vote along party lines. This is because in a PR 
Parliament MPs owe strong allegiance to their party, as parties take the central role in 
determining the makeup of Parliament under MMP. 387 This is particularly true of MPs 
who come to Parliament from party lists. as they do not have a separate democratic 
mandate from the party. 
Therefore, ruling parties would be able to use Parliament in much the same way as 
they presently do provided the party can reach agreement, notwithstanding the Cabinet's 
separation from Parliament. Hence, while this system would be a substantial 
384 G Palmer New Zealand's Co11srirutio11 in Crisis (John Mclndoe, Dunedin, 1992) 18. 
385 This is possibly happening to a certain extent already, for example Donald Brash being elected to 
Parliament from the National Party list, wanting to be Minister of Finance, but not a constituent MP. 
386 Indeed these are the central reasons driving Boston' s and Roberts' arguments that Ministers should be 
able to be appointed from outside of Parliament; J Bo con and N Roberts in J Boston The Fwure of Cab111er 
Govem111e111 in New Zealand: The implications of MM P for !he Formation Organization and Operations of 
Cabinet (GSBGM Publications, Wellington , 1994) 14 - 15; and J Boston and N Roberts "Bringing in the 
Outsiders" (6 March 1994) The Dominion Wellington 6. 
387 B Ackerman 'The New Separation of Powers" (2000) 113 Harv L Rev 633 , 665. 
59 
improvement, the amount of improvement it is capable of is limited. The Senate option 
described below would be of furth e r benefit. 
3. A Second House of Parliament. 
Under this model the legislature should be divided into two houses . The lower house 
(herein referred to as the "House") should be elected entirely by PR, without any 
electorate MPs. Cabinet government would continue, and draw its membership 
exclusive ly fro m th e House. The upper house (herein refetTed to as th e "Senate") would 
be a pure ly legislati ve body, e lected by FPP. Its approva l wo uld be necessary fo r all 
matters except confidence and suppl y. Therefore the government wo uld onl y need to 
maintain the confidence of the House. 
Thus, the current electorate seats would all be transferred up to the Senate, and th e 
House would become an entire ly proportion ate body. Voting would re ta in its prese nt 
fo rmat. The present '·party" vote would determin e proporti onately the membership of th e 
House, and the present representati ve vote would determine th e member who would 
represent each present electorate in the Senate. 
The Senate should have full equality with the House. Rathe r the "one and a half 
house" solution of Professor Ac kerm an, 388 and the simil ar recommendati ons of Dr 
Stockely
389 
are endorsed . The Senate· purpose is to chec k the government and protect 
. b d I . I . 190 T h f . S against a eg1s at1 on.· ere ore, 1t is unnecessary to con ult the enate with matters 
of supply and confidence. Moreove r, not hav ing such powers in the Senate removes th e 
potential for an equi valent of the Whitl am cri sis to emerge where the Senate . under th e 
control of a different party to the lower ho use holds the government to ransom. ''JI 
388 B Ackerman ·The New Separation of Powers·· (2000) 113 Harv L Rev 633. 67 1 - 680. 
389 A Stock ley ··Bicamera lism in the ev, Zealand Contex t" ( 1986) 16 VUWLR 376. 397 - 400. 
390 A Stock ley, abo,e. 396. also 383 - 386 
39 1 
A Stockley, above, 398 - 399. However, i t is suggested that a limited power to delay matters of fi nance 
suggested by Dr Stockley is unnecessary. For a narrati ve of the Whitl am affa ir see P A Joseph 
Constitutional and Ad111inis1rat ive Law in New Zealand (2 ed, 2001 , Butterworth s, Wellington, Nev\ 
Zealand) 687 - 689 (although the discuss ion is directed towards the role of the Crown the descripti on of the 
events and the di scussion is useful ). 
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However, if the Senate is to be a powerful body which can act as a genuine check on the 
legislature it should be able to prevent the passage of non-money legislation. 392 
As discussed above, a central idea of modern doctrines of the separation of powers is 
arranging government so that the various institutions check and balance each other. 393 If 
the legislature is to become a genuine check on the other branches of government, rather 
than its current status as a hunted object, it must have some mind of its own. A second 
chamber, with substantial power, whose members will no doubt have party affiliations, 
but will have a democratic mandate to act on their own volition, would best achieve these 
goals. In such circumstances the legislature will be able to function as an effective check 
on the executive. 394 
Hence, this system was in part designed to create a system where the legislature, or at 
least part of it, specifically the Senate, is not bound by rigid party discipline. If party 
discipline can be weakened, then the legislature can become an autonomous body in its 
own right, independent of the executive. Furthermore, a weakening of party discipline 
will make it harder for one party to exercise dominion across the legi slature and 
executive even if the same party controls both branches, because there is less discipline in 
the Senate. This will lead to a balancing of power thereby restricting it. 
If the Senate is to be an effective body its members must be elected. 395 First, elected 
Senators will have the necessary democratic mandate to give the Senate the legitimacy to 
392 ft is accepted that thi s is contrary to the recommendations of the Royal Commission on the Electoral 
System, and the recent moves towards reform of the House of Lords. However, if the Senate is to be more 
than a revising chamber then it should have more than a power of delay. See Report of the Royal 
Commission on the Electoral System To1vards a Beller Democracy (Government Printer. Wellington. 
1986) 281: Joint Committee on House of Lords Reform House of Lords Reform: Secolld Report (The 
Stationary Office, London, 2003) 9: Government Response to the Royal Commission The House of Lords 
Completing the Reform (The Stationary Office, London, 2000) 13 - 14 . 
393 See Pan 11 E 2 Balanced Government above. 
394 The potential of a second chamber to act as an effective check v. as recognised b1 the Royal Cornm1ss1on 
on the Electoral System. See Royal Commission on the Ele toral System Towards a Beuer Democracy 
(Government Printer, Wei lington, 1986) 281. 
395 Royal Commission on the Electoral System. above. 28 1, A Stockley .. Bicameralism in the ew Zealand 
Context" ( 1986) 16 VU WLR 376. 397 - 400. 
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function autonomous! y necessary to check government. 396 Second, if the members are 
appointed then there is the risk that the party in the lower house will flood the Senate 
with their nominees. 397 This would totaJly compromise the independence of the 
Senate. 398 
The failings or an appointed upper house can be seen in the hi story of the New 
Zealand Legislative Council. 399 The Legislative Council had become redundant lon g 
before it was abolished, because appointments had ruined its independence and 
· · 400 leg1t1macy. Similarly, the national government's appointing members to the 
Legislative Council who would vote to end bicameralism demonstrated that appointed 
members compromises the independence of the upper house_.rni 
The dynamics of PR and party discipline dictate that the Senate must be elected by 
FPP.
402 
Whenever MPs are elected proportionately, there will be inclinations towards 
party discipline.'rn3 Hence, to give Senators an independent mandate, and therefore the 
legitimacy to cross party lines , they should be elected directly as individuals by their 
electorate. Additionally. the party members of each electorate should choose the 
Senators to stand their party at the general election. This will help ensure that Senators 
will not be servile to the party cause but will owe their legitimacy primarily to their 
electorate. 
wo A Sto<.:kley .. Bicameralism in the Ne\\ Zea land Context'' (1986) 16 VUWLR 376,399. 
397 A Stockley, above, 398. 
398 A Stockley, above, 398. 
399 For a history of the demise of the Legislative Council see W K Jackson The New Zealand Legislative 
Council, A Study of the Establish111e11t, Failure and Abolition of the New Zealand Legislative Council 
(University of Otago Press, Dunedin, 1972) 154 - 212. 
;oo W K Jackson The New Zeala11d Legislative Council, A Study of the Establishment, Failure and Abolition 
of the New Zealand Legislative Council (University of Otago Press , Dunedin, 1972) 183. 
;oi W K Jackson, above, 195 - I 97. 
;o2 As is discussed in thi s pan. this is particularly true when the lower house is elected by MMP. The 
author suggests the need to have different electora l methods for the two hou,es explains that the most 
recent major consideraLion given to a Senate in New Zealand considered a Single Transferable VOLe 
method of election the Senate and FPP for the House preferable. See Electoral Reform 811! I 992 and the 
relevan t Parliamentary debates: ( 15 December 1992) 532 NZPD 13 157 - 13 177. 
403 See Part IV A I A Presidential System above. 
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Additionally, if both houses were elected by PR, the most likely result would be 
identical representation in each house. 404 Having PR in the House and FPP in the Senate 
would give a different balance in party representation between the two houses. Such is in 
accordance with the law of off-setting symmetries, common in federal states which have 
two houses. 405 This is essential to the functioning of the Senate, as having both chambers 
elected in the same fashion would prevent the Senate from being an effective check on 
the government, because the same parties would dominate both houses .
406 
Furthermore, an upper house will tend to work better if party discipline is not so rigid 
as to stifle independent judgment necessary to make the upper house a genuine check.
407 
Indeed. even if the houses were offset in a PR system, the encouragement to vole along 
party lines in PR systems would render the sys tem less workable than if the upper house 
was FPP where party discipline stands a better chance of being broken down. 
Senator's membership of a party will still encourage them to vote along party lines. 
However, their democratic mandate will be personal, having been elected at all stages by 
members of their electorate. Furthermore, being in the Senate will prohibit them from 
being given a Cabinet portfolio. Therefore, there will be less political incentive for them 
to vote along party I ines to get promotion. Senators would answer first and foremost to 
the members of their electorate; hence they could legitimately act autonomously. 
Furthermore, because the Senate would be a pure legislative body it would be ideal 
for reviewing regulations made by the exec utive whose leadership would be drawn from 
the lower branch. This wou ld retain pure legis lati ve control over a quasi-legislati\\:~ 
function exercised by the executive. If regulations could be disallowed by the upper 
404 There is the potential for creating minor differences by having different voting age for the chambers. 
and by having some appointee! members in the upper house. as is the case in ltal y. B Ackerman ··The Ne1,1, 
Separation of Powers" (2000) l 13 Harv L Re, 633, 685. 
405 B Ackerman ··The New Separation of Powers" (2000) l l 3 Harv L Rev 633, 686. 406 B Ackerman, above, 686. 
407 A Stockley "Bicameralism in the New Zealand Context" (1986) 16 VUWLR 376,399 
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house alone the independence and pure legislative nature of the Senate would give the 
power to review regulations would be given added vitality.-W8 
Additionally, Senators. because of their independence from the legislative branch 
would be ideally placed to critique governmen t policy and work on committees ... 09 This 
would be a welcome change from the present situation where because of excessive 
workloads and deference to party Caucuses, select committees have not been independent 
reviewers of the executive_ .. ,o Essentially, the independence of the Senate would further 
the separation of the executive from Parliament begun by MMP, and increase the benefits 
that have been gained from that reform. 
However, it would be hard to persuade New Zealand to adopt this model. 41 1 To 
maintain electorate sizes close to the present it would be necessary to have a upper house 
of about 60 MPs ... 
12 
To give MPs of the House more time and let them do their job 
better. membership should rem ain at its 120 ... 13 Given the resistance to expanding 
Parliament by 20 MPs_ .. , .. when MMP was introduced. having 60 more MPS will 
undoubtedly be an unpopular suggestion. 
408 This would also be a su itable response to claims that the Regulations are inadequately controlled: G 
Palmer '·Deficiencies in ew Zealand Delegated Legislation" ( 1999) 30 VUWLR l. 
409 A Stockley .. Bicameralism in the New Zea land Context" (1986) 16 VUWLR 376,385 . 
.iio R Mulgan Poli1ics in New Zealand (2 ed. Auckland University Press, Auckland , 1997) 126 - 127 . 
.ii 1 It is notable that w ith the exception of the Rt Hon Jim Bolger Parliament showed little en thusiasm for a 
Senate when it was tabl ed as a considerat ion in 1992. However, a reading of the debates indicates this was 
in part driven by a desire to focus attention on MMP rather than a Senate at that stage of New Zea land's 
constitutional reform. See (15 December 1992) 532 NZPD 13157 - 13177. 
m At present electoral sizes average approximately 54,300. Having a cap of 60 electorates wou ld probably 
mean this would change to about 62.000 depending on other variables such as population. South Island 
North Island sp lit. In formation from Elecuons e~, Zealand ·· ell' Zealand's Electoral System·· 
Im ://w11'\\ .e lecti ons .oro .nz/electionsfrs1~t/hounJaries dra11 n.htrnl (last accessed 1-l September 2001 ) 
-1i 3 Although. 1f there was too much oppos1uon to having 60 new MPs. the number o l MP~ 111 the hou,e 
could be revised back to about the I 00 mark , as members of the House 11 ou ld not have to Juggle electorate 
work w ith nati onal mauers. 
414 J Vowles, J Karp, S Banducci P Aimer, R Miller .. Reviewing MMP" in J Vowles. P Aimer, J Karp. S 
Banducci R Miller, A Sullivan Proponional Represewario11 on Trial: The / 999 New Zeala11d Ce11 eml 
Election and 1he Fare ofMMP (Auckland University Press . Auckland, 2002) 175 , 177 . 
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The main drawback of this option is that PR would be diluted by the FPP Senate, 
which the major parties would be expected to dominate. However, the loss of PR should 
not be overstated. 
First, the makeup of the most important house, and the identity of the government 
would still be determined by PR. Further, it is not suggested that PR should be 
abandoned. The diversity of MMP parliaments is a welcome change and should be kept 
in the House.+ 15 While it has been suggested that the upper house should be elected by 
PR.+ 16 it is submitted that under the proposed system PR is important enough that it 
should determine the makeup of the more powerful House, and therefore also the identity 
of the government. Second, it is submitted that the loss of PR is outweighed by the need 
to balance the constitution. FPP elections for the Senate would be a positive step in 
constitutional Jaw rather than a retrograde step in electoral law . 
FinaJly, constitutional innovation should not be feared. As N W Barber has 
argued:+ 17 
Sometimes it is not possible. or not sensible, to all ocate a new task to pre-existing institutions· a 
new structure must be created to accommodate the task. Separation of powers ,s noc therefore JUSt 
a theory about the division of powers. it is also concerned wich the creauon of institutions. 
Thus consideration should not be confined to rearranging existing government bodies 
418 so as to separate them and make them check each other better. In summary, these 
arrangements would provide for an efficient, yet balanced constitution that meets muster 
under analysis against the separation of powers, which would also retain the most 
important aspects of Parliamentary government. 
415 See J Karp ·'Members of Parliament and Representation" in J Vowles, P Aimer, J Karp, S Banducci R 
Miller, A Su Iii van Propor1io11al Represellfation on Trial: The 1999 New Zeala11d General Election and the 
Fate of MMP (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2002) 130, 135 - 136. The arguments for MMP are 
beyond the scope of this essay. However, the essay proceeds on the premise that PR should be kept. 
416 G Palmer New Zealand's Co11stitutio11 in Crisis (John Mcindoe, Dunedin, 1992) 124. 
417 N W Barber "Prelude to the Separation of Powers" (200 1) 60(1) CLJ 59, 73. 
418 RM Unger Knowledge and Polirics (The Free Press, New York, 1975) l: RM Unger Lc111 · 111 Modem 
Society (The Free Press, New York, 1976) l-3. 
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B. Expanding The Power of the Judiciary. 
1. Judicial Independence. 
Because enforcing the rights of minorities 1s necessarily counter-majoritarian, the 
judiciary 's independence from the political process makes them the best-placed body for 
ensuring the effective enjoyment of basic human rights. o other branch shares the 
judiciary's independence necessary to ensure the liberty of minorities is respected. 
Legislatures by their political and popular nature. are ill placed to protect rights in a way 
that will be unpopular.-+ 19 They are by their nature "the rule of law's public enemy 
number one."420 
In contrast the judiciary are protected from influence by other branches or 
government.
421 
Furthermore, in New Zealand the judiciary has had a proud tradition of 
b . 1· . II I -+27 erng po 1t1ca y neutra. -
A L d S 'd B S 423 " I . I I . . l d s or teyn sa1 in rown v tott on y an ent1re y neutra , 1mpart1a , an 
independent judiciary can carry out the primary task of securing and enforcing 
C . . h ,,-t?-t onvent1on ng ts. - Similarly the European Court of Human Rights has noted the 
impartiality of the Courts is a '·fundamental principle."-+25 
With respect the how a lack of judicial independence affect the right to a fair trial-+ 26 
Lord Bingham commented in Millar v Dickson that:-+27 
419 
Lord Cooke of Thorndon "The Role of Judges" in C James (ed) Building 1he Co11Sliruuo11 (lnsc,cute ot 
Policy Studies, Wellington , 2000) 371. 
-1zo B Ackerman ··The New Separation of Powers" (2000) 113 Harv L Rev 633, 715 . 
rn Constitution Act 1986, ss 23 and 2-1. 
-1n G Palmer & M Palmer Bridled Power - Ne11 · Zeala11d Government Under MMP (3 ed, Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1997) 243. 
m Brown v Stott [2001] 2 WLR 817 (PC). 
-1
2
-1 Brown v Stott, above, 840 Lord Steyn. 
425 
De Cubber v Belgium ( 1984) 7 EHRR 236, 246 (ECHR). See the similar approach of the ECHR in 
Bulut v Auslria ( 1996) 24 EHRR 8-1 (ECHR). 
-1
26 International Covenant on Civil and Political Ri ghcs Arc 6( l ). 
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The conduct of trial s at all stages by an independent and impartial tribunal 1s 111 my v1e11 
recogni sed by the Convention and the authorities.... It is a safeguard which should not.. be 
weakened or diluted whatever the political consequences. 
Similarly the Bill of Rights guarantees everyone charged with an offence "the right to a 
fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial court."428 Therefore, judicial 
independence is a fundamental prerequisite of the preservation of liberty. 
While the Judiciary's motivations may have elements of politics, they are the most 
detached from the political process. As the development of Cabinet government has 
shown, the interests of the legislature and the executive are too closely aligned for them 
to be trusted to check the excesses of each other.429 Rather the tendenc y of party politics 
is to consolidate power, not limit it. The judiciary alone stand suffi cientl y disinterested lo 
check whether other branches of governme nt ha ve exceeded their mandate . 
Judicial independence becomes a particularl y important consideration if the courts are 
to have increased power. Although popular conceptions are that judges should not be 
given more power because they are detached from public/political control, it is preci se ly 
because judges are independent that they should be entrusted with more power than the1 
currently have. 
The tradition non-partisan political appointments 111 ew Zealand430 is to be 
encouraged as it supports a judiciary who are free of political influence, which is of 
increased importance should their constitutional function be enhanced. It 1s most 
unfortunate that there have been moves by the ACT party, and in particul ar Stephen 
m Millar v Dickson 2002) l WLR 1615, 1638 (PC) Lord Bingham . 
.ns New Zealand Bill of Rights Acts 25(a). 
m See part III A 1 Cabinet Government above. 
-1
3o G Palmer U11bndled Power: An /111 rod11crio11 to Ne11• Zealand 's Co11 s1i1111io11 a11d Government (2 ed , 
Oxford University Press, Auck land , 1987) 182 . 
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Franks, to make judges subject to a recall. 431 The inevitable effect will be to compromise 
the integrity of judges. They will no longer be able to give judgment without fear or 
favour because they risk recall for unpopular decisions . If the current appointments 
process in New Zealand cannot protect the independence then we should not opt for a 
politicised appointments process or electoral system. 432 
2. Judicial Enforcement of the Constitution. 
A Constitution cannot be balanced if the judiciary are unable to enforce it. At 
present judicial review of executive action places limits on the executive. In a balanced 
Constitution similar limits must be placed on the legislature.433 This would also require 
the adoption of a written Constitution, so that the Courts had a concrete document to 
434 enforce. 
The following argument for expanding the Courts power of judicial re view to 
include legislation proceeds in two parts. First, it is submitted that the constitutional 
functions of each branch and the corresponding limitations of those functions must be 
capable of judicial enforcement, Acts of the legislature notwith standing. Second. it is 
submitted that there is also a clear and convincing case for makin g the Bill of Ri ghts 
supreme law. In the alternati ve if the Bill of Ri ghts is not ex tended to permit judicial 
rn S Franks, comments made at public lecture: J Waldron ·' Retroact i ve Law: How Dodgy \\US 
Duynhoven?" (Public Lecture Victoria Uni vers ity of Wellington Law School, Wellington, 21 A ugust 
2003). 
m D Gambrill "Chief justice says no to electing judges: Politici zing courts would undermine independence 
and impartiality" Law Times http://www.canadalawbook.ca/headlines/headline276 arc.html (last accessed 
4 October 2003) 
433 Thi s paper does not propose to make a complete case for judicial review of legislation. Rather the focus 
of thi s section is that if the Constitution is to be balanced there must be Judicial review of leg1slauon. 
Hence the wider arguments for and against judicial review of legislation wi ll not be fully canvassed. 
434 Adopting a written constituti on on its own remains a topic of debate in New Zealand. For a recent 
rejec tion of the idea see J A llen ··No to a Written Cons ti tuti on '· in C James (ed) Bt11/d111g the Co11s111ww11 
(Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, :WOO) 391. Consequen ti ally the fu ll debate will not be en tered 11110 
here. It is noted in passi ng that a written co nst itution is not as bad a thing as its detractors would suggest. 
It is of note that New Zealand is onl y one of three western coul1lries that do not have a wnuen const1tut1rn1 
(the others being the Uni ted Kingdom and Israel): M Russell "Respons1bilit1es of Second Chambers" 111 N 
DJ Baldwin and D Shell (eds) Second Chw11bers (Frank Cass , London. 2001) 61. 63 
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review of inconsistent legislation , then the Courts should be more aggressive in their use 
of the Bill of Rights, and should recognise judicial indications of inconsistency. 435 
Despite the problems with Parliamentary supremacy,436 there still remain those who 
contend that there is no need for the Courts to be able to judicially review legislation. For 
example in N Barber has argued that: 437 
There is.. no obvious reason why the courts should assume a general jurisdiction to police 
divisions of power within the const itution. The power of the courts over other institutions is a 
crucial question of ,nstitutional co mpetence: the court process is not necessaril y the best forum for 
the crafti ng of our const iwuon. 
Janet McLean has also made similar comments in a New Zealand context. 438 
So far as this suggests that the Courts should not enforce the limits of government 
powers under the Constitution. this approach is misguided."m There must be checks on 
the functions of the different branches of government, otherwise there can be no balance 
in the system . .i.io The inevitable tendency will be for people to accumulate power, which 
if unchecked will result in one group accumulating too much. There must be an 
independent body that will prevent government bodies from exceeding the proper limits 
of their powers. 
435 Judicial indications of consistency have been recogn ised to a limited extent in R v Pow11ako [20001 2 
NZLR 695 (CA) and Moonan v Fi/111 and Li1era111re Board of Review [2000] 2NZLR 9 (CA). However 
there is still some debate, or at least denial, from the Crown that declarations of inconsistency are an 
established part of the law. 
436 See Pan III A 2 Uncontrolled Law Making above. 
437 W Barber '"Prelude to the Separation of Powers " [2001] CLJ, 59 , 88 
438 J McLean ·'Legislative ln valiclation. Human Rights Protection and s 4 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act" [200 I J Ne1r Zealand Lln1· Revieu· -+21. 4-+8. 
439 It is accepted that the Courts may have limitations with respect to deciding budgetary allocauons. 
However. even thi s is subject to argument. For example the Constitution of South Africa recog111ses 
cultural and economic right s which historicall y were regarded as non-j usticiable, although how just1c1able 
such rights are under the South African Constitution is open to some debate. 
440 See Part II B Pure Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances and Part II E 2 Balanced Government 
above. 
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Essentially a lack of judicial review means that the constitution is ultimatel y at the 
whim of the legi s lative branch, subject to the Courts' powers of interpretation. Even the 
stron gest critics of the American separation of powers reject the notion that the 
legislature can alter the constitution at it sees fit. Rather. judici al review of legislation i~ 
seen as an essential element of a constrained parliamentarianism.441 
The concept of the legislature being above the law is a dated one,442 and strikes at the 
heart of government by and under law. In contrast to Hobbes conceptions of 
parliamentary sovereignty Marshal CJ' comments in Marbury v Madison remain 
· 443 apposite: 
The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those 
limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts 
allowed, are of equal obligation. I t is a proposition too plai n to be contested, that the constitution 
controls any legislati ve act repugnant to it. 
The dangers of the constitution being at the whim of the legislature are well 
demonstrated by the abolition of the legislative council in New Zealand. Despite the 
Legislative Council's inacti vity, its abolition was New Zealand's most significant 
constitutional change in the first half of the twentieth century ... 44 This change was made 
on the strength of a 51.4% National majority at the preceding general election.445 Given 
that a victory at a general election is only a broad assessment of a party's performance. 
lacking the specificity of a referendum or strong threshold of a super-majority in 
Parliament, this is inadequate legitimisation for such significant constitutional change. 
In the first instance such changes should require more than a majority vote in 
Parliament to prevent easy alteration. Furthermore, it is nece sary that there must be a 
44 1 B Ackerman ··The New Separation of Powers·· (2000) 113 Harv L Rev 633. 641. 
442 See the discussion of Hobbe in Part III A 2 Uncontrolled Lawmaking above. 
443 Marbury v Madison ( 1803) I Cranch 137, 145. 
444 W K Jackson The Ne11· Zealand Legisla1ive Council, A Sllldy of The Eswblish111e111, Failure and Aboli1io11 
of the New Zealand Legislati,,e Council (University of Otago Press, Dunedin, 1972) 198. 
445 W K Jackson, above, 196. 
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body to ensure compliance with the rules. Therefore the Constitution should be supreme 
law . Otherwise the constitution will be mere window dressing. 
The judiciary are the best placed body to exercise this function. First. they are the 
most politically neutral branch of government..i-.6 Second, they are necessarily the 
weakest branch. 447 Third, such questions of constitutional interpretation are best dealt 
with as questions of law. As such the judiciary is the only body suited to interpreting and 
policing the boundaries of the Constitution. 
3. A Supreme Bill of Rights. 
Although for sli ghtly different reasons, the Bill of Rights should also become 
supreme law. This move would be in accordance with the comments of New Zealand's 
international obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,-1-1s and has been urged on ew Zealand by the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee.
449 
It is submitted that this is a necessary check on the power of the 
legislature to protect liberty. 
However, it has recently argued that the current system, particularly with the 
intenelationship and dialogue between the Courts and Parliament. is sufficient to protect 
individual liberty.-iso This defence of the current Bill of Rights is based on the argument 
446 See Pan IV B l Judicial Independence above. 
447 Hamilton Federalist 78in S F Mittell (ed) The Federalist ( 1ati onal Home Library Foundation. 
Washinton DC, 1961 ) 502 - 511. 
448 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art 2(3)(b). 
449 Conc luding Comments of the Human Rights Committee: New Zealand 30 October 1995 
CC{R/C/79/Add 47: A/50/40 para 185 in Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade "Human Rights in ew 
Zealand" (1995 ) 56 MFAT !nfomw1ion 811/le1111. 
450 See J McLean "Legi slati ve ln va l1dation, Human Ri ghts Protecuon and s -l of the e1-, Zea land 811! of 
Rights Act" l200 l] New Zealand Lcnl' Review 42 l. It is noted that McLean focuses on the actual record of 
human rights enforcement not theoretical possibilities . see McLean, above. 444. Thus the criticisms of this 
paper are directed at a slightl y different purpose, to show the problems that can arise under our present 
constitutional arrangements, and how these should be remedied. 
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that interpretation is a sufficiently powerful tool.-151 With respect this type of argument is 
superficial. 
In arguing this position Janet McLean uses Pora to show that in the face of a clear 
legislative breach of human rights the Court managed to vindicate rights,-152 making a 
supreme bill of rights is unnecessary. This analysis misses the reality of what Pora did. 
Essentially the Pora decision read down offensive provisions in quasi-supreme law 
fashion. It is circular to suggest that this Westminster jurisprudential equivalent to a 
supreme bill of rights means that we do not need a supreme bill of rights. Furthermore. 
the strong reaction of the Court in Pora was necessary to ensure a change in the law after 
earlier criticism of the legislation in Poumako was not sufficient to persuade Parliament 
to repeal the act.-153 This illustrates that mere judicial/legislative co1Tespondence and in 
particular judicial subservience are insufficient to protect liberty. Rather. the courts must 
take decisive action to ensure the effective enjoyment of rights. 
The argument that judicial review of legislation is unnecessary ultimately comes to 
rest on the argument that (as proposed by Barber) "legislatures are at least as good as 
other institutions in reaching necessary decision that do not admit of a technical 
solution."454 Barber reaches this conclusion after highlighting the problems judges can 
have in creating law that has implications beyond the specific case at hand _-155 In defence 
of this position Barber cites Brown v The Board of Education of Topeka"56, to illustrate 
the problems courts encounter in trying to formulate and implement law that has wide 
. 1 · . -157 imp 1cat1ons. 
451 See in particular J McLean ·'Legislative Invalidation , Human Rights Protection and s 4 of the ew 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act" (2001] New Zealand Law Review 421, 435 - 436. 
452 J McLean , above, 443. 
45 3 J McLean, above, 443 notes that the lack of reaction in Pownoko provoked the Pora response. 
454 N W Barber "Prelude to the Separation of Powers" (2001] CLJ, 59 , 87. McLean advances a similar 
argument, although based more on a judiciary/legislature interaction J McLean , above, 448. 
455 N W Barber ·'Prelucle to the Separation ol' Powers" [200JJ CLJ, 59. 74 - 84. 
456 Brown v Th e Board of Ed11ca1io11 for Topeka ( 1954) 34 7 US 483 ( USSC) . 
45 7 N W Barber, above, 79. 
72 
There are three principle objections to the argument Barber adv ances. First, it mi ss-
appreciates the independence of the judiciary, which make the Courts the appropri ate 
body to enforce often counter-majoritarian limitations on the legi s lature by enforcing 
h · h -l5 8 uman ng ts . 
Second, the reliance on the example of Brown, is misplaced. Rather than supporting 
judicial review of legislation , Brown is a paradigm example of circumstances where it is 
essential for the judiciary, rightly removed from democratic control, to protect minority 
interests imperilled by the actions of the majority that would otherwise go uncorrected. 
In the 1950s legislative change could not be made to racially discriminatory laws .459 
Because of white co ntrol in the so uth 460 it would have been unthinkable to attempt to 
persuade state leg is latures to pass an ti- egregation legislation . Similarly so uthern 
Democratic domination of Congress made the Federal situation not much bette r. 461 
Legislative change to segregation was simply not an option until 10 years after Brown, by 
which time the courts had already made man y major initial changes. 462 Hence, liti gat ion 
was the only option for ending a fundam entally unjust system.463 
Third, aski ng judges to judici all y rev iew legislation does not ask them to make po li cy 
decisions , but to apply the law. 464 The limits of the incremental approach of the common 
law, and appropriate deference465 will mean that the common law is carefully developed. 
While there are limitations to the courts ab ilities,
466 
it would be wise not to underestimate 
458 See Part IV B I Judi cial Independence above. 
459 See D Bell And We Are No, Saved (Basic Books, New York , 1979). 
460 J Greenberg Crusaders in 1he Co11r1s (Basic Books, New York, 1994) 108 - 109. 
461 For an example of the lengths that white southern Congressmen wou ld go to to prevent any progress1 ve 
race relations laws see J Greenberg, above, 16 - 17 . 
462 J Greenberg, above, 11 6, 260 and 267. 
463 For an example of the lengths that whi te southern Congressmen would go to prevent any progressive 
race relations laws see J Greenberg, above, 16 - 17. Furthermore, the violem background to Broll'n and the 
violence following Bro11111 's implementation uggest that there would have been res istance however 
desegregation had been implemented , at least during the l 950's . To attribute the problems of judge made 
law is misleading. For a we ll researched accoun t of southern racial violence around the Bro11111 period see 
M Belknap Federal un,· 011d Sow hem Order ( Uni vers1t y of Georgia Press. A thens, 1987 ). 
464 G Palmer Ne11 · Zealand':, Co1!Sfi/lt1io11 i11 Cm,is (John Mcindoe, Dunedin, 1992) 70. 
465 See the di sc uss ion of clue deference in Pan IV B 4 Judicial Review of Executi ve Ac ti on be low. 
466 N W Barber '·Prelude to the Separation of Powers" [200 l ] CLJ, 59, 7-i - 84. 
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the potential of judges to understand society. If they lack knowledge of social issues than 
Brandeis briefs can help fill that gap ... 67 
Therefore arguments against the transfer of power to an unelected judiciar) are 
misconceived. The judiciary are the only branch that can effectively serve this purpose. 11 
is necessary that they serve it, and they are competent to do so. 
4. Judicial Review of Executive Acrion. 
The position of R v Gardiner with respect to the non-requirement of positive legal 
authority for the executive invasions of privacy should be oven-uled. 468 If can-ied to its 
logical conclusion it would mean that the executive did not require positive authority for 
its acts. In addition to dispensing with internationally recognised standards, 469 and 
established common law in celebrated cases such as The Case of the Proclamations,-+ 70 
Entick v Carrington, n, Fitzgerald v Muldoon and Transport Ministry v Payn, -+72 this 
would end judicial review of executive acts; .. 73 a necessary check on the power of the 
executive. Furthermore, if the executive can act on its own vo lition in this manner one 
questions what role the legislature has. 
Rather than let judicial scrutiny ebb it should be re-invigorated . Expansions of 
administrative law through cases such as CREEDNZ v Governor General,-+N Anning v 
Minisrer of Education,-+75 Drew v Allomey General and Taito v R-+76 which have shown an 
m These have already had some use in New Zea land , for example in Ministry of Transport v Noori (1992] 
3 NZLR 260 (CA). 
468 R v Gardiner ( 1997) 4 HRNZ 7, 11 (CA) Blanchard J. 
469 
See Malone v U11ited Ki11gdo111 (1984) 7 EHRR 14 (ECHR); Halford v United Kingdom (1997) 24 
EHRR 523 (ECHR); Kopp v Switzerland ( 1998) 27 EHRR 91 (ECHR); Valen::.11ela Contreras I ' Spa111 
(1998) 28 EHRR 483 (ECHR); Amann v Swit::.erland (2000) 30 EHRR 843 (ECHR); Funke v France 
(1993) 16 EHRR 297 (ECHR) . 
470 The Case of the Proclamaiions (1611) 12 Co Rep 74 
471 Entick v Carrington ( 1765 ) 19 St Tr 1030. 
m Transpon MinisTry v Payn [1977J 2 NZLR 50 (CA). 
m H Schwartz '"The Shon Happy Life and Tragic Death of the New Zea land Bill of Right~ Act '" 119981 NZ 
Law Re v 259. 302. 
m CREEDNZ v Covemor-Ceneral [ 198 11 I NZLR 172. 
415 Anning v Minister of Ed11ca1ion CP (26 April 2002) High Court Wellington CP 122/00 Goddard J. 
476 Tai10 v R (2002) 6 HRNZ 539. 
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increased willingness for on the part of the judiciary to genuinely look at the legality of 
executive and indeed judicial actions477 are positive moves. In a balanced constitution 
the courts should not ensure that all branches of the government stay within their 
limits.478 
The principle of legality is also a positive move in this regard. Under this doctrine 
unless there are clear words to the contrary then the courts will not infer on Parliament an 
intent to legislate against the rule of law ... 79 This is endorsed as a necessary check 
particularly in the absence of an entrenched bill of rights. This has already recei ved 
endorsement in Drew,480 and it is submitted that this is good law. which should be 
utilised to check the executive branch, and read down offensive legislation . 
As Vile has noted, historically it is not necessarily proper to refer to English courts as 
the defenders of the people against the other branches of the state.481 If Vile is con-ect the 
extending of judicial review by way of concepts such as the principle of legality is a 
healthy progression. The ew Zealand courts should not go down the restrictive 
interpretations and willingness to protect human rights that can be seen in the dissenting 
judgment of Scalia Jin Lawrence v Texas. 482 
Indeed, in our present constitutional arrangements, precisely because of parliamentary 
supremacy. the judiciary should be all the more active in checking the executive and 
protecting the individual by giving restrictive interpretations to oppressi\e statutes. 
Otherwise Parliament and the executive will overbalance the already delicate 
relationship . 
. m Taito v R (2002) 6 HRNZ 539, this overruled the finding of non-justiciability by Tipping J at an earlier 
stage in the Taito proceedings: Nichols 1· Registrar of the Court of Appeal [ 1998] 2 ZLR 385 . 430 (CA) 
Tipping J. 
478 Note that s 27(2) of the Bill of Rights contains the right to judicial review indicating its importance. For 
the importance of access to the courts see also RB Cooke ··Fundamentals" [ 1988] ZLJ 158. 
•
79 This was first developed in the case of R v Secretary of the Staie for 1he Home Depanmem exp Pierson 
[ 1998] 2 AC 539 (HL); affirmed in R v Secreta,y of the Stme for the Home Department exp Simms [2000] 
2 AC 115 (HL); R (Daly) v Secretary of the State for the Hom e Department (2001] 2 WLR 1622 (HL), 
480 Drew v Attomev-Ce11eral [2002] 1 NZLR 58, 70 (CA) Blanchard J 
481 M J C Vile Co,;stitutio11a/is111 and the Separation of Po1vers (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967) 32 1. 
•
82 Lawrence v Texas (2003) US Lexis 50013 (USSC). 
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Use of indication s of inconsistenc y under the Bill of Rights would be a positi ve step 
within our current constitutional arrangement. Andrew Butler has suggested that thi s 
would have to change separation of powers as it currently stands in ew Zealand.
483 It is 
submitted that if this does involve a change, 484
 it would be a positive one. Notions of 
Parliamentary sovereignty are outdated .
485 To suggest that Parliamentary sovereignty 
should still extend to stopping the Courts from questioning Parliament neglects to balance 
government bodi es. If the Courts do not to check the formally unrestrained power of 
Parliament, the least that they can do is formally inform Parli ament when it has legi slated 
contrary to fundamental human rights. 486 
However, in exercising judici al rev iew of legislation and of exec uti ve acts the courts 
should follow doctrine of due deference which is currently developing in the English 
co urts. Under the doctrine of due deference the courts should pay appropriate, but not 
blind, respect to the proper function s of other branches of government.
487 
This still allows democratic institutions to make decisions,
4 8 provided that they are 
within the appropriate matters. Whil e the courts' expertise in areas outside the law can 
•
33 AS Butler ··Judicial Indications of Inconsistency - A New Weapon in the Bill of Righrs Armoury')" 
[2000] NZ Law Review 43, SS. 
•
34 Given the stern criti cism of Thomas J that rhe retrospective legis lation was close to an ace of attainder: R 
v Pownako [2000] 2 NZLR 695, 7 12 - 7 13, also 7 10 (CA) Thomas J, it seems that Mr Butler 1s 
exaggerating the current situation in saying that courts have not previously passed j udgment on the legal 
quality of legislation; A S Butler "Judicial Indications of Inconsistency - A New Weapon in the Bill of 
Rights Armoury?" (2000] NZ Law Review 43 , 55 . 
•
35 See International Covenant on the Protection of Civil and Political Rights Art l and Conc luding 
Comments of the Human Rights Comm ittee: New Zealand 30 October 1995 CC { R/C/79/ Acid 47: NS0/40 
para 185 in Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade ··Human Righrs in New Zealand'" (1995) 56 MFAT 
!11fo r111a tio11 Bulletin . 
.is6 Nore chat thi s is provided for under rhe Human Rights Ace 1998 (UK) . s 4. This 1s does not seem to 
have caused any undue problems; see Lord Irvine, The Lord Chancellor .. The Human Rights Ac t Twu 
Years On: An Analysis" (l November 2002) Durham University Inaugural f-lwn an Rights Lecture 
http://www. lcd.gov.u k/speeches/2002/lcO 11102.htm (last accessed 7 May 2003 ). 
487 D Dyzenhaus ·'Judicial Review and Democracy" in M Taggart The Province of Ad111inistrati1•e u.111 · 
(Oxford : Heart. 1997) 302-308: R A Edwards ··Judicial Deference Under the Human Right Act" (2002) 
MLR 65:6 November 859, 879: R v British BroaDC, 196lc1S1ing Co ,poration exp Pro/1fe ALiiance [20031 
UKHL 23 , [75 J (HL) Lord Hoffman . 
•
33 See for example R v British Broa DC, 196 /asting Corporation exp Pro/ife Alliance [2003] UKHL 23, 
[ 132] per Lord Walker and the authorities ci ted therein. 
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be assisted by Brandeis brief couns do lack the expertise of speciali ed institution ' .-1 . 9 
Hence there are \alid con titutional limitation as to area - that 'ouns should become 
involved in. Thus clue deference,, ill mitigate against the undemocratic nature of Judicial 
· -190 d review, an provides a means by which the legislature can make necessary poliC) 
clecisions.491 
However. the amount of judicial deference which is appropriate hould not be 
overstated. As Lord Hoffman stated in his speech in Prolife Alliance: •91 
Although the word "deference" is now very popular in describing the relationship between the 
judicial and the other branches of government, I do not think that its overtones of servility, or 
perhaps gracious concession, are appropriate to describe what is happening. In a society based 
upon the rule of law and the separation of power , it is necessary to decide which branch of 
government has in any particular instance the decision-making power and what the legal lim1ts of 
that power are .. The principles upon which decision-makmg powers are allocated are principle\ 
of law ... The principle that the mdependence of the courts is necessary for a proper dec1s1on of 
disputed legal rights or claims of violation of human rights is a legal principle.. On the other 
hand, the principle that majority approval is necessary for a proper decision on policy or allocation 
of resources is also a legal principle. 
Essentially the courts should respect the legislative and executive branche of 
government_ but should not submit to them. -193 Similarly. the attitudes of the members or 
all the branches are important. When exercising power all bodies of government should 
be mindful of their constitutional function.-19-1 While some tension between the branches 
is an essential element of the separation of powers,495 this should not deteriorate to 
•
39 RA Edwards ·'Judicial Deference Under the Human Rights Act" (2.002) MLR 65:6 November 859. 59 . 
•
90 R A Edwards , above, 859. 
•
91 For example due deference would let the legislature set maximum working hours for children. compare 
to Wilson v Receivers of 1he Missouri, Oklaho111a & Gulf Railway Company ( 1918) 234 US 332 (US ). 
492 R v Brilish Broad Casting Corporcaion exp Prolife Alliance [20031 UKHL 23 , [751 - [76) (HL) Lord 
Hoffman. 
•
93 D Dyzenhaus ·'Judicial Review and Democracy" in M Taggart The Pro1·i1Lce of Ad111111is1m111 •e urn 
(Oxford: Heart, 1997) 302-308; R A Edwards "Judicial Deference Under the Hu1:1an Rights Act" (2002) 
MLR 65:6 November 859, 879. 
494 M J C Vi le Conslillltionalism and !he Separcaion of Po11 ·ers (Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1967 J 296 and 
312. 
•
95 Myers v US ( l 926) 52 US 272, 293 (USSC) Brandeis J (dissenting). 
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constitutional crisis that will destroy the balance that the separation of powers seeks to 
provide. 
Thus the courts should be aggressive in checking the actions of the legislature and the 
executive, while under exercise due deference to mitigate against the undemocratic nature 
of judicial review.496 and with courts' lack of experti e vi -a-vis specialised 
institutions ... 97 so as to strike a balance b'"'tween democracy and constitutionality. 
V. CONCLUSIONS. 
In summary it is suggested that ew Zealand's Constitution. particularly following 
the introduction of MMP, is moving towards conformity with the doctrine of the 
separation of powers. However, improvement can still be made. It is hoped that the 
reforms proposed in this paper may help further improvement. 
The points that the author is most attached to are one; that New Zealand's 
Constitution at present is incapable of securing liberty, and two; that this must be 
changed. The reforms proposed are suggested as beneficial ideas, but the options for 
reform are infinite. Any changes that will remedy this situation, without going too far in 
the other direction , are welcomed. 
Constitutional reform relates to liberty, not politics. If we are genuinely committed to 
liberal ideals then we must be prepared for change to protect these them. ew Zealand 
cannot remain in the constitutional wilderness forever - ultimately change must come.498 
It is hoped that the analysis and suggestions offered in this paper will help further ew 
Zealand's constitutional maturation. 
496 RA Edwards, above, 859 . 
497 Hanclyside v United Kingclo111 ( 1976) I EHRR 737 (ECHR) f 48] - [50]; R A Edwards, above, 859. while 
not yet widespread Brandeis briefs have been used in New Zealand already, for example in Mi11is1n· of 
Transport v Noort [ 1992] 3 NZLR 260 (CA). 
498 G Palmer New Zealand 's Consti1111ion in Crisis (John Mclndoe, Dunedin , 1992) 174. 
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